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I. INTRODUCTION

On January 11, 2006, William Smith Jr., a sixty-five-year-old
convicted sex offender,' moved into a small wooden house behind a daycare center in Ocala, Florida.2 His housewarming, however, was shortlived. The day after Smith moved in, local police officers arrived at his
house and informed him that he would have to find another place to call
home.3 Under a new city ordinance, sex offenders guilty of crimes against
children under the age of sixteen are prohibited from living within 1,500
feet of locations where children gather.4 When Smith failed to take steps
to change his residence,5 on January 30, 2006, he became the first person
arrested under Ocala's residence restrictions.6
Ocala is not the only place where sex offenders face restrictions on
where they may reside. Twenty different states and a spate of local
governments have turned to residential buffer zones as a possible method
of preventing sex crimes against children.7 Expanding upon registration

1. Millard K. Ives, PoliceArrest Sex Felon Living NearDaycare, STAR-BANNER, Jan. 31,
2006, at Al. Smith had been convicted in Miami in 1990 of sexual battery on a child under the age
of thirteen. Id. Throughout this Note, the term "sex offender" is used to describe a broad class of
sex offenders, including any person who has been convicted of a sex crime, regardless of the
severity of the crime or likelihood of reoffending. Conversely, the term "sexual predator" is used
sparingly to refer to only those repeat offenders who have been classified as more dangerous
offenders under the law.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. OCALA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 15-3 (2005).

5. Ives, supra note 1, at Al. While police officers sat down with Smith and pointed out
potential residences in Ocala on a map, Smith claimed that he could not afford to move until he
received his pending government check. Id.
6. Id.
7. See RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79D.0712][h] (Michael Allan

Wolf ed., 2006) [hereinafter POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY].

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss5/5

2

Wernick: In Accordance
with PublicWITH
Outcry:
Zoning
Out Sex Offenders Throug
OUTCRY
A PUBLIC
IN ACCORDANCE

laws aimed at keeping tabs on previously convicted sex offenders,8 state
lawmakers have enacted residence restrictions prohibiting sex offenders
from living near schools and other child-centered facilities. 9 Not satisfied
with existing state legislation, numerous municipalities have passed or are
considering laws imposing even harsher restrictions.'" In the spirit of the
Not in My Backyard (NIMBY) movement, these laws often appear to be
an attempt by towns, cities, counties, and other local governments to expel
sex offenders altogether."
Proponents of residence restrictions argue that there is no cure for sex
offenders and that sex offenders have a high rate of recidivism that makes
them a potential threat forever.' 2 Opponents counter that recent studies
show no causal link between proximity of sex offenders to children and the
propensity of recidivism.' 3 Despite evidence that residence restrictions

8. See Lucy Berliner, Sex Offenders: Policy andPractice,92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1203, 1216-18
(1998) (discussing the development of sex offender registration and community notification statutes
in the 1990s).
9. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2006) (prohibiting sex offenders convicted of sexual
battery, lewd or lascivious conduct, sexual performance involving a child, or the selling of a child,
from living within 1,000 feet of a school, day-care facility, park, or playground when the victim
of the offense was under the age of sixteen). For a list of other states that have enacted residence
restrictions, see statutes cited infra note 60.
10. See POwELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supranote 7, at § 79D.07[2][h].
11. See Doron Teichman, The Marketfor CriminalJustice:Federalism,Crime Control,and
Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1831, 1850 (2005). Teichman asserts that
jurisdictions often adopt harsh policies aimed at driving unwanted persons or activities away,
especially when neighboring jurisdictions are engaging in the same policies. Id. "[S]uch laws and
policies are another example of what has become known as Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY)
legislation, which aims to remove unwanted activities to other jurisdictions." Id.
12. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700,707 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 757 (2005)
(relaying the testimony of a psychologist that "'there are never any guarantees that they might not
reoffend' and that "there are 'very high rates of re-offense for sex offenders who had offended
against children"'); Samantha Imber, Sexual Offenses: ProhibitSexual Predatorsfrom Residing
Within Proximityof Schools or Areas Where Minors Congregate,20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 100, 101
(2003) (stating that restrictions on locations of residence are necessary because sex offenders are
"virtually impossible to rehabilitate and these crimes are so difficult to detect and control"); Steve
Thompson, Sex Offender Law Criticizedfor IncreasingRisk, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 16,
2004, at B I, availableat http://www.sptimes.com/2004/05/16/news-pf/Pasco/Sexoffenderlawcrit.shtml (quoting Florida State Senator Mike Fasano as stating that "[n]o longer will the
worst of the worst be allowed to live anywhere near a location where children spend most of their
waking lives").
13. See Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, Facts About Adult Sex Offenders,
http://www.atsa.com/ppOffenderFacts.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2006) [hereinafter ATSA Policy
Statement]. In fact, opponents argue that sex offenders may be more likely to reoffend under these
residence restrictions because of emotional distress associated with being segregated from
society and lack of access to treatment. MINN. DEP'T OF CORR., LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDERS
RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT ISSUES: 2003 REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 9-10 (2003) (revised
Feb. 2004) (finding such problems with residence restrictions as "a high concentration of
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may be missing the mark when it comes to preventing sex crimes
involving child victims, courts are typically reluctant to interfere with state
legislatures on how best to protect the health and safety of their citizens. 4
In light of the Eighth Circuit's ruling in Doe v. Miller'5 and the Supreme
Court's decision not to grant certiorari, 6 it seems unlikely that Florida's
current legislation will succumb to constitutional challenges.
The recent upsurge in municipal efforts to enact even stricter residence
restrictions, however, is cause for concern. 7 These municipal ordinances
may be pre-empted by, or in conflict with, state law when the state has
already occupied the field. Most importantly, and from a policy
perspective, tougher residence restrictions may not solve the problem.
Even if these ordinances are constitutional on their face, the myopic race
to exclude sex offenders from communities could potentially increase their
propensity to reoffend.' 8
The Florida Legislature is continuously re-thinking its comprehensive
approach to the sex offender problem.' 9 This Note evaluates Florida's

offenders with no ties to the community; isolation; lack of work, education, and treatment options;
and an increase in the distance traveled by agents who supervise offenders"); Jill S. Levenson &
Leo P. Cotter, The Impact ofSex Offender Residence Restrictions:1,000 FeetFrom Dangeror One
Step From Absurd?, 49 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & CoMP. CRIMINOLOGY 168, 174 (2005)
(relaying comments of sex offenders in Florida that residence restrictions do not stop them from
seeking out victims).
14. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441-42 (1985) ("[W]here
individuals in the group affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests
the State has the authority to implement, the courts have been very reluctant ... to closely
scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how, and to what extent those interests should be
pursued.").
15. 405 F.3d 700.
16. Doe v. Miller, 126 S. Ct. 757 (2005).
17. See Amy Sherman & Nikki Waller, Creatinga 'Devil's Island,' MIAMI HERALD, May
30, 2005, at lB.
18. See Monica Davey, Time Served: Barringthe Unwanted,Iowa's Residency Rules Drive
Sex Offenders Underground,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2006, at Al (summarizing the argument that
residency restrictions are ineffective because they increase homelessness and clustering of sex
offenders).
19. See, e.g., H.B. 91, 108th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (prohibiting sex offenders from
living within 2,500 feet of schools, day-care facilities, parks, playgrounds, public school bus stops,
or "other places where children regularly congregate"); H.B. 251, 108th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla.
2006) (expressly permitting counties and municipalities to create residence restrictions independent
from state law); H.B. 591, 108th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (prohibiting sex offenders from living
"within 1,500 feet of any school, day-care center, park, playground, library, or other business or
place where children regularly congregate"); S.B. 768, 108th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006)
(prohibiting sex offenders from living within 2,500 feet of schools, day-care facilities, parks,
playgrounds, public school bus stops, or other places where children regularly congregate and
defining "within 2,500 feet" as being measured as a straight line between two property boundary
lines). Although none of these bills were enacted into law during the 2006 Florida legislative
session, a number of state legislators have continued to discuss strengthening laws against sex
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residence restrictions against sex offenders in light of the most recent
developments in the courts and discusses potential solutions to protecting
these restrictions against litigation. This Note will proceed with a
background on sex crimes, discussing the progression of restrictive
legislation aimed at sex offenders, from registration and notification laws
to new laws that effectively quarantine sex offenders from certain
neighborhoods. This Note will then address constitutional challenges faced
by state and local governments and the recent holding in Doe v. Miller,
upholding the legitimacy of these laws.
In the wake of Doe v. Miller, this Note will analyze Florida's approach
to residence restrictions against sex offenders and the likelihood that these
buffer zones will withstand judicial scrutiny. Even assuming that states
and local governments will be afforded broad discretion, there are several
concerns that must be addressed to protect against as-applied challenges
and to create more effective laws, including the potential conflict between
state and local laws. This Note will conclude with a proposal for creating
uniform legislation that withstands judicial scrutiny while effectuating the
legislative purpose of protecting children from future harm.
II. PROGRESSION OF LEGISLATION AIMED AT SEX OFFENDERS

A. StrangerDanger: The Sex Offender Problem
Sex crimes2" have long been considered among the most monstrous
offenses in society, especially when the victims are children.2" More often
than not, victims of sex crimes are under the age of eighteen.22 In addition

offenders, and surely laws against sex offenders remain a topic of discussion around the state.
20. The term "sex crimes" includes a number of different offenses involving sexual violence
and exploitation. For a listing of those crimes involving children, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0435
(1)(a) (West 2006) (identifying a sex offender as a person who has committed, attempted, or
conspired to commit kidnapping, false imprisonment, luring or enticing a child under the age of
twelve, sexual battery, procuring child for prostitution, indecent exposure, sexual exploitation of
a minor, obscenity, involvement in pornography, and the selling and buying of minors).
21. Janis F. Bremer, Juveniles, Rehabilitation, and Sex Offenses: Changing Laws and
Changing Treatment, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1343, 1346 (2003) ("A sexual offense in our
society is generally seen as the most heinous of crimes, particularly if the victim is a child.");
Roxanne Lieb et al., Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 CRIME & JUST. 43, 46-50 (1998)
(discussing different reasons why sex offenses are distinguished, including cultural norms, the role
ofgender, psychological consequences, and the victim/offender relationship); Leonore M.J. Simon,
Sex Offender Legislation andthe AntitherapeuticEffects on Victims, 41 ARIz. L. REv. 485,485-86
(1999) (stating that there is an assumption that sex offenders specialize in sex crimes and have
mental disorders that make them more dangerous than other criminals).
22. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS

24 (1997) [hereinafter SEX OFFENSES] (finding that a majority of sexual assault victims in 1995
were under the age of eighteen). "Victims of sexual assault were the youngest victims among those
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to suffering physical harm, child victims of sex crimes suffer
psychological injuries with enormous long-term impacts on these young
victims, their families, and even society at large.23 Furthermore, the
victimization of children is an even greater problem than many people
perceive, considering that many sex crimes go unreported.24
Despite evidence that the majority of sex crimes involving children are
committed by friends and family members,25 extensive media coverage of
child abductions has drawn significant attention to "stranger danger"26 and
contributed to a rising fear of habitual sex offenders. 27 Because there is no
commonly recognized cure for sex offenders, 28 and because research

persons described by incarcerated violent state prisoners. The median age of the victims of
imprisoned sexual assaulters was less than [thirteen] years old." Id.
23. See Berliner, supra note 8, at 1206 (asserting that research has shown that victims of sex
crimes are more likely to develop Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder); Lieb et al., supranote 21, at 4546 (examining whether sex offenders should be treated as a special class of offenders). While the
nature of the offense and level of violence involved will surely alter the impacts on each individual
victim, the sexual component of sex offenses involves a personal invasion inherently different from
other crimes that leads to enhanced psychological harm. Id. at 48. For an examination of the effects
on society, see Larry K. Brown, M.D. et al., Impact of Sexual Abuse on the HIV-Risk-Related
Behavior of Adolescents in Intensive Psychiatric Treatment, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1413-15
(2000) (finding that sexually abused adolescents were more likely to contract STDs and were more
likely to engage in types of behavior related to HIV infection); SEX OFFENSES, supra note 22, at
23 (finding that in a study of state prison inmates "[s]exual assault offenders were substantially
more likely than any other category of offenders to report having experienced physical or sexual
abuse while growing up").
24. See National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, Frequently Asked Questions and
Statistics, http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry
=enUS&Pageld=242#3a (last visited Sept. 4,2006) (stating that "[s]tatistics show that 1 in 5 girls
and 1 in 10 boys are sexually exploited before they reach adulthood, yet less than 35% of those
child sexual assaults are reported to authorities").
25. See Daniel L. Feldman, The "ScarletLetterLaws" of the 1990s: A Response to Critics,
60 ALB. L. REV. 1081, 1107 (1997) (stating that "[b]etween seventy-five.and eighty-nine percent
of child sexual abuse is committed by relatives and friends" (quoting Bonnie Steinbock, Megan's
Law: A Policy Perspective, 14 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 4, 5 (1995))).
26. See Cory Reiss, Dealingwith the Sex Offenders: Many PoliticiansTalk Tough, but From
There, the Solutions Aren't Easy, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., June 14, 2005, at BI (stating that
"stranger danger" gets the most press and is the driving force behind most of the legislation against
sex offenders).
27. See Caroline Louise Lewis, The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against ChildrenandSexually
Violent Offender RegistrationAct: An UnconstitutionalDeprivation of the Right to Privacy and
SubstantiveDue Process,31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 89, 89, 92 (1996) (reciting the tragic stories
of Megan Kanka and Jacob Wetterling as the impetus for laws requiring sex offender registration);
Lisa Henderson, Comment, Sex Offenders: You are Now Free to Move About the Country. An
Analysis of Doe v. Miller's Effects on Sex Offender Residential Restrictions, 73 UMKC L. REV.
797, 801-02 (2005) (noting that in reaction to "media induced fears, the public ... insists these
offenders be immediately removed from society and harsher laws [be] enacted to prevent such
atrocities").
28. ATSA Policy Statement, supra note 13.
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suggests that sex offenders have a higher rate of recidivism than non-sex
offenders,29 there is a persistent perception that every child is a potential
victim to the stranger lurking around the corner.3 ° The array of media
attention directed toward sex crimes and their perpetrators, in the form of
news reports and television programming,3 ' has propelled this perception
forward and generated
a climate of intolerance towards sex offenders in
2
the community.
Growing concern has prompted more than a decade of legislation to
counter sex crimes against children. This legislation has progressed from
laws focused on identifying sex offenders and notifying the public, to laws
that literally remove certain offenders from a community altogether.33 One
thing is obvious from the progression of legislation against sex offenders:
As long as courts remain deferential to legislatures, lawmakers are
continuously willing to revamp these laws to alleviate public anxiety.
B. Identification andNotification Laws
In reaction to public concerns for children's safety, both individual

29. See generally SEX OFFENSES, supranote 22 (citing statistics that indicate sex offenders
are far more likely to be re-arrested for another sex crime than other violent offenders).
30. See Joelle Anne Moreno, "Whoever FightsMonsters Should See to It That in the Process
She Does Not Become a Monster": Hunting the Sexual PredatorWith Silver Bullets-Federal
Rules of Evidence 413-415--anda Stake Through the Heart-Kansasv. Hendricks, 49 FLA. L.
REV. 505, 506-07 (1997) (noting the depiction of sex offenders in mass culture as demonic sexual
monsters).
31. VICTOR E. KAPPELER ET AL., THE MYTHOLOGY OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25 (2d
ed. 1996) (explaining the media's obsession with sex offenders); see also Harold Miller, John
Walsh -America's Most Wanted, AUBURNPUB.COM, Feb. 26, 2006, http://www.aubumpub.com/
articles/2006/02/26/news/lake life/feat04.txt (discussing the abduction of Adam Walsh in 1981 and
the popularity of FOX TV's "America's Most Wanted," hosted by Adam's father, John Walsh).
Most recently, Dateline NBC has found a solid audience for its 'To Catch a Predator' series, in
which Chris Hansen exposes sexual predators prowling the Internet for children by luring them to
a house under the pretense of fulfilling sexual fantasies with teenagers only to find a camera crew
and a team of police officers waiting nearby. Dateline NBC, To Catch a Predator: Potential
Predators in Petaluma (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 29, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14824427/).
32. See Henderson, supra note 27, at 801-02 (discussing the relationship between media
coverage, public fear, and political action in relation to legislation aimed at sex offenders). In
addition to media coverage, there are several other reasons why legislation has been directed at
non-familial sex offenders. See Lieb et al., supra note 21, at 54 (surmising that political support is
strongest for protection against serious injury often incurred from non-familial offenders, that intrafamilial offenses are not perceived as a threat to the entire community, that intra-familial offenders
are easier to supervise than extra-familial offenders, and that non-familial offenders as individuals
are more dangerous because they tend to have a greater number of victims).
33. Compare Megan's Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e)(2) (2006)), with Jimmy Ryce Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 394.910-.930
(2005).
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states and the federal government have enacted laws aimed at identifying
sex offenders and notifying communities of their whereabouts. In 1994,
partially in response to the abduction of eleven-year-old Jacob Wetterling
in Minnesota,34 Congress passed a federal law requiring all sex offenders
to register with local law enforcement and submit information on their
permanent residence." In 1996, in the wake of the murder of seven-yearold Megan Kanka in New Jersey,3 6 President Bill Clinton signed "Megan's
Law,"37 which added a requirement that states create notification protocols
that provide public access to information on registered sex offenders.3" By
August 1996, all fifty states and the District of Columbia had enacted their
own version of Megan's Law,39 and many states now have websites to
disseminate information to the public.4" Sex offenders challenged these
laws, arguing that they constituted retroactive punishment in violation of
the Ex Post Facto Clause.4 In 2003, in Smith v. Doe, the Supreme Court
upheld registration laws as valid state regulatory schemes and concluded
that information about sexual predators may be posted on the Internet.42
34. See Jacob
Wetterling
Foundation,
The Jacob Wetterling
Story,
http://www.jwf.org/ReadArticle.asp?articleld=34 (last visited Sept. 4,2006). Jacob Wetterling was
an eleven-year-old boy from St. Joseph, Minnesota who was kidnapped in 1989 on his way home
from a convenience store. Id.This case served as a wakeup call for law enforcement agencies that,
at the time, did not have comprehensive lists of sex offenders from which to start an investigation.
35. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071
(2006)).
36. Megan Nicole Kanka Foundation, Mission Statement, http://www.megannicole
kankafoundation.org/mission.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2006). Megan Kanka was a seven-year-old
girl from Hamilton Township, New Jersey who disappeared on July 29, 1994. State v.
Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 66 (N.J. 1999). One ofthe Kanka's neighbors, Jesse Timmendequas,
a convicted sex offender, admitted luring Megan into his house, sexually assaulting her, and
brutally suffocating her to death. Id. at 68-69.
37. Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 14071(e)
(2006)).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e). Megan's Law also required that states maintain a website for
disseminating information. Id. § 14071 (e)(2). That same year, Congress passed the Lynchner Act,
which toughened up registration requirements for sex offenders, imposed fines for failure to
register, and created a national database under the supervision of the FBI. Pam Lynchner Sexual
Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-236, 110 Stat. 3093 (1996)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(2) (2006)). Today, the National Sex Offender
Registry (NSOR) is accessible to the public and provides links to individual state registries. See
National Sex Offender Registry, http://www.nsor.net (last visited on Feb. 16, 2006).
39. Teichman, supra note 11, at 1854.
40. See, e.g., Fla. Dep't of Law Enforcement, Florida Sexual Offenders and Predators,
http://www3.fdle.state.fl.us/sopu/index.asp?PSessionId=676547599& (last visited Mar. 18,2006);
Office of the Att'y Gen., Cal. Dep't of Justice, Megan's Law-Information on Registered Sex
Offenders, http://www.meganslaw.ca.gov (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
41. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84,91 (2003).
42. Id. at 105-06 (finding that the law did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the
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In 1995, Florida lawmakers amended the Florida Sexual Predators Act
to require sexual predators to register with law enforcement and
authorizing law enforcement to notify communities of their presence.43
Under the Act, sexual predators must register with the Department of Law
Enforcement and maintain that registration for the rest of their lives."
Once a sexual predator registers, local law enforcement agencies are
required to disseminate information about the offender's description,
crimes committed, and current residence.45
Those offenders not included under the Florida Sexual Predators Act
are subject to virtually the same requirements under the Sex Offender Act.
Adopted in 1997, the Sex Offender Act requires sex offenders to register
with their local sheriffs' offices within forty-eight hours of release from
custody or relocation into Florida and to maintain registration for life.'
The major difference between the two acts is that under the Sex Offender
Act, community
notification by law enforcement agencies is not
47
mandatory.

Registration and notification provisions in both the Florida Sexual

Alaska Legislature intended a sex offender registration law to operate as a civil regulatory scheme
rather than criminal punishment). Furthermore, the Court determined that use of the Internet to
disseminate information to the public was a legitimate way to effectuate public safety and "the
attendant humiliation is but a collateral consequence of a valid regulation." Id. at 99.
43. 1996 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 96-388 (West) (as codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.21 (2005)).
Sexual predators are designated as those persons committing felony sex crimes in Florida, those
persons labeled sexual predators in other states, and those persons who have been labeled predators
through civil commitment. FLA. STAT. § 775.21(4) & (5) (2005).
44. FLA. STAT. § 775.21(6). Information required includes a sex offender's name, social
security number, age, race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, hair and eye color, and all permanent
and temporary addresses. Id.
45. Id. § 775.21(7).
[Tihe sheriff of the county or the chief of police of the municipality where the
sexual predator temporarily or permanently resides shall notify each licensed day
care center, elementary school, middle school, and high school within a 1-mile
radius of the temporary or permanent residence of the sexual predator of the
presence of the sexual predator.
Id.
46. 1997 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 97-299 (West) (as codified at FLA. STAT. § 943.0435
(2005)). Under the Sex Offender Act, sexual offenders are defined as persons who have committed,
or attempted, solicited, or conspired to commit kidnapping, false imprisonment, luring or enticing
a child under the age of twelve, sexual battery, procuring a child for prostitution, indecent exposure,
sexual exploitation of a minor, obscenity, involvement in pornography, and the selling and buying
of minors. FLA. STAT. § 943.0435(l)(a) (2005). Sex offenders are also persons who have been
designated as sexual predators in another state. Id.
47. CompareFLA. STAT. § 943.0435(7)(a)(2) (2005), with id. § 775.21.
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Predators Act and the Sex Offender Act have withstood judicial scrutiny.48
In 2003, in response to a conflict between the Second and Third District
Courts of Appeal,4 9 the Florida Supreme Court held that the Sexual
Predators Act was constitutionally valid because it did not violate
procedural due process or separation of powers.5° In 2005, faced with a
class action suit challenging the legitimacy of the Sex Offender Act, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the Act,
holding that the registration provisions did not violate due process, equal
protection, right to travel, or separation of powers.51
Clamping down on sex offenders continues to be a hot-button issue in
Florida and lawmakers have developed more creative ways to protect
against future offenses. In 1998, the Florida Legislature passed the Jimmy
Ryce Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators'
Treatment and Care Act,52 establishing civil commitment procedures for
those sexual predators with mental disorders that increase their likelihood
ofreoffending.53 In 2005, the Florida Legislature tightened up laws against
sex offenders, passing the Jessica Lunsford Act.54 The Act increases the
mandatory prison term for sex crimes against children younger than twelve
from ten to twenty-five years.55 The Act also requires certain offenders

48. Milks v. State, 894 So. 2d 924,925 (Fla. 2005); Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1349 (11 th
Cir. 2005).
49. Compare Milks v. State, 848 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (upholding the Florida
Sexual Predator Act), with Espindola v. State, 855 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (striking down
the Florida Sexual Predator Act on grounds that it violated procedural due process rights).
50. Milks, 894 So. 2d at 925. The Florida Supreme Court resolved the conflict, stating that
the existence of a prior conviction is the only material fact under the Florida Sexual Predators Act,
and both defendants received "a procedurally safeguarded opportunity" to contest that fact. Id. at
928 (citing Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003)).
51. Moore, 410 F.3d at 1349.
52. 1998 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 98-64 (West) (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §§
394.910-.930 (2005)).
53. The Act authorizes the state attorney, following a written assessment and
recommendation by experts, to file a petition stating that a person is a sexually violent predator who
should be confined to civil commitment. FLA. STAT. § 394.914 (2005). A person may be subjected
to civil commitment only upon determination by clear and convincing evidence that the person is
a sexually violent predator. Id. § 394.917. The Act requires that a person committed have a mental
examination at least once every year to determine whether to continue holding that person
involuntarily. Id. § 394.918.
54. 2005 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2005-28 (West).
55. FLA. STAT. § 775.082 (3)(a) (2005). For a life felony committed on or after September
1, 2005, which is a violation of FLA. STAT. § 800.04 (5) (referring to lewd or lascivious molestation
of a victim less than twelve years old), the offender is to be punished by:
a. A term of imprisonment for life; or
b. A split sentence that is a term of not less than 25 years imprisonment and not
exceeding life imprisonment, followed by probation or community control for
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placed on conditional release supervision to be monitored by global
satellite positioning devices for the rest of their lives.56 Additionally, the
Act authorizes prosecutors to file felony charges against anyone who
knowingly helps a sex offender avoid reporting requirements, including
failure to report non-compliance.57
C. Development of Residence Restrictions
In 1996, Florida became the first state to enact statewide residence
restrictions against sexual predators whose victims were children.5" In
1999, Alabama was the first state to extend those restrictions to a broad
class of sex offenders.5 9 Since then, at least twenty states have enacted
residence restrictions, in one form or another, prohibiting sex offenders
from living within a specified distance from schools and other childcentered facilities.60
the remainder of the person's natural life as provided in s. 948.012 (4).
Id. § 775.082 (3)(a)(4).
56. Id. § 948.012(4). The statute provides that "for offenses committed on or after September
1, 2005,... [the] probation or community control portion of the split sentence... must extend for
the duration of the defendant's natural life and include a condition that he or she be electronically
monitored." Id.
57. Id. § 775.21 (10)(g). Any person who intentionally assists a sexual predator by failing to
report non-compliance, providing false information about a sexual predator, and harboring or
concealing a sexual predator commits a third degree felony. Id.
58. 1996 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 1996-388 (West). The residence restrictions under this
statute apply only to the limited number of sex offenders labeled sexual predators and who are
subject to Florida's Conditional Release Program. FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a) (2005).
59. 1999 Ala. Legis. Serv. 99-572 (as codified at ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a) (2005)).
60. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a) (2005) (restricting offenders from living or working
within 2,000 feet of school or child-care facility); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) (2005)
(prohibiting level 3 and 4 offenders from residing within 2,000 feet of an elementary school,
secondary school, or day-care center); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003(g-h) (Deering 2005) (prohibiting
sex offender released on parole from residing within one-quarter mile of a school, or within onehalf mile of a school if the offender is deemed to be a high risk to the public); FLA. STAT. § 794.065
(2005) (prohibiting sex offenders whose victims were under sixteen from "living within 1,000 feet
of a school, day care center, park, or playground"); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2006) (prohibiting
sex offenders from living or loitering "within 1,000 feet of any child care facility, church, school,
or area where minors congregate"); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b) (2005) (prohibiting sex
offenders from residing or knowingly loitering within 500 feet of a school); IND. CODE ANN. § 1113-3-4(g)(2) (LexisNexis 2005) (prohibiting a sex offender on parole from residing within 1,000
feet of school property for the remainder of parole, unless parole board provides written
exemption); IOWA CODE § 692A.2A(2) (2005) (prohibiting convicted child sex offenders from
residing within 2,000 feet of a school or child-care facility); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.495
(LexisNexis 2005) (prohibiting sex offenders from residing within 1,000 feet ofa school, preschool,
or day-care facility); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(A)(2) (2005) (prohibiting sex offenders from
residing within 1,000 feet of any school, day-care facility, playground, youth center, public
swimming pool, or video arcade facility); MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 28.735(1) (2006) (prohibiting

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

11

FLORIDA
Florida Law Review,
Vol.LAWREVIEW
58, Iss. 5 [2006], Art. 5

[Vol. 58

States take different approaches to defining the category of offenders
subject to these residence restrictions. For example, Louisiana's residence
restrictions apply only to those offenders deemed "sexually violent
predators,"6 while Ohio includes a broader group, restricting any "person
who has been convicted of, is convicted of, has pleaded guilty to, or pleads
guilty to either a sexually oriented offense that is not a registrationexempt.., offense or a child-victim oriented offense."'6 2 As discussed in
more detail in Part III, Florida maintains two different residence
restrictions: one for sexual predators and one for general sex offenders.63
States also vary in their methods of punishing offenders who
knowingly violate the residence restrictions. The majority of states impose
criminal penalties for violations, with some states applying uniform
penalties and others imposing punishment based on the sex offender's
previous conviction.' Ohio, however, merely provides for injunctive

persons required to register as sex offenders from residing within "student safety
zones"-equivalent to 1,000 feet from a school); Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.147 (2005) ("Any person
who has ... been convicted of ... [certain sexual crimes against minors] shall not establish
residency within one thousand feet of any public school,... any private school.... or child care
facility"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.16 (2006) (prohibiting registered sex offenders from
"knowingly" residing with 1,000 feet of any school or child-care center); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2950.031 (A) (LexisNexis 2005) (prohibiting any sex offender from residing within 2,000 feet of
a school); 57 OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 590 (2005) (prohibiting sex offenders from living within
2,000 feet of a public school site or educational institution); OR. REV. STAT. § 144.642(l)(a) (2005)
(authorizing the Department of Corrections to adopt rules including a "general prohibition against
allowing a sex offender to reside in any dwelling, with the exception of a treatment facility or
halfway house, near locations where children are the primary occupants or users"); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 22-24B-23 (Michie 2006) (prohibiting sex offenders from residing or loitering within 500
feet of any school, public park, playground, or pool); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211 (a) (2005)
(prohibiting sex offenders from living within 1,000 feet of a school, child-care facility, or day-care
center); TEX. CODE CRIMv. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 (13B) (Vernon 2005) ("If... a child.., was the
victim of the offense, the judge shall [require] that the defendant not.., go in, on, or within 1,000
feet of a premises where children commonly gather .. "); W. VA. CODE § 62-12-26(b)(1) (2006)
(prohibiting certain paroled sex offenders from residing or working "within one thousand feet of
a school or child care facility.. ."). In addition to current statewide restrictions, at least two states
have enacted enabling legislation, giving local governments authorization to enact residence
restrictions. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4017 (2006) ("A political subdivision may enact an
ordinance, resolution, or other legal restriction prescribing where sex offenders may reside" so long
as "the restrictions are limited to sexual predators, extend no more than five hundred feet from a
school or child care facility" and do not apply to retroactively or to sexual predators who reside in
state-owned prisons or correctional facilities); S.B. 6325, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006)
(enabling Washington cities to create statewide standards for imposing residence restrictions).
61. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1 (2005).
62. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.031(a) (LexisNexis 2005).
63. CompareFLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a) (2005), with id. § 794.065.
64. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(d) (2006) (making a violation of residence
restrictions a felony offense punishable by "imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 30
years"), with FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2005) (making a violation a felony of the third degree
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relief, allowing neighbors and local prosecutors to petition the courts to
forcibly remove sex offenders from buffer zones.65
Local governments have enacted their own residence restrictions. Many
have taken action because their constituents feel that statewide restrictions
are inadequate to combat against the threat of sex offenders living near
schools and other child-centered facilities.66 While some have tailored
ordinances to avoid litigation and ensure that the restrictions apply to only
the most dangerous offenders,67 the majority of local governments appear
to be more focused on creating broad buffer zones that leave limited
options for sex offenders to find housing.6 8 Regardless, many local
officials admit that they feel pressure to enact some sort of legislation
when neighboring towns and cities have already acted.6 9
Surely there is a legitimate and important purpose behind residence
restrictions: to prevent convicted sex offenders from committing further
crimes against children.7" Lawmakers believe that by restricting access to

punishable by up to five years imprisonment when the violator was previously convicted of a first
degree felony; but making a violation a misdemeanor of the first degree punishable by up no more
than one year imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $1,000).
65. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2950.03 1(B) (West 2006) (providing that when an
offender violates the provisions of the statute, an owner or lessee of real property within a 1,000
foot buffer or the prosecuting attorney for the municipality with jurisdiction over the area affected
shall have "a cause of action for injunctive relief against the person").
66. See Karen Sloan, Bluffs Sex Offenders on the Move Where Can They Live? 'Really
Nowhere' Left, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 18, 2005, at 01 A (stating that the City of Des
Moines, in response to concerns over sex offenders' potential residence locations, passed a stricter
ordinance to extend the 2,000-foot restriction "to include parks, swimming pools, libraries and
recreational trails"); Davey, supra note 18, at Al (stating that Galena, Illinois passed a local
ordinance to prevent Iowa's sex offenders from finding refuge across the border).
67. See Michael Pritchard, Mullica Twp. Restricts Where Sex Offenders Can Live, PRESS
ATLANTIC CITY, Jan. 26, 2006, at C4 (stating that Mullica Township, New Jersey created a less
restrictive ordinance that only applies to Tier II and III sex offenders and does not bar sex offenders
from living near bus stops).
68. See Jim Saunders, Lawmakers Want State to Create Uniformity in Sex PredatorRules,
DAYTONA BEACH NEWS-JOURNAL, Oct. 20, 2005, at IC (detailing the efforts of a number of
municipalities in Florida that have enacted buffer zones above and beyond the 1,000-foot statewide
restrictions).
69. See Pritchard, supra note 67, at C4 (quoting a local official as saying "[w]e didn't want
to be the only town without such an ordinance and then actually finding ourselves to be attracting
sex offenders to the township").
70. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 704 (stating that the Iowa General Assembly enacted
legislation creating residence restrictions on sex offenders "in an effort to protect children in Iowa
from the risk that convicted sex offenders may reoffend in locations close to their residences"); Ga.
House Daily Report, 2003 Reg. Sess. No. 37 (Ga. 2003) (documenting the unanimous vote to pass
residence restrictions "designed to protect [Georgia's] youngest and most vulnerable citizens"); see
also Ian Demsky, Sex Offenders Live NearMany Schools, Day Cares,TENNESSEAN, July 18, 2005,
at Al (quoting Tennessee District Attorney John Carney, who helped draft state legislation, as
saying that "[t]he primary purpose is to protect children" and that "[i]t all boils down to the specific
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schools and other places where children congregate, sex offenders will
have less interaction with children and be less able to act on their impulses
to reoffend.7 ' Residence restrictions are thus another weapon in the
prophylactic arsenal of laws enacted to reduce the overall number of
crimes against children.72 Though there is no evidence to prove that these
laws have any impact on the number of offenses committed,73 several state
legislatures are taking steps to expand their restrictions to cover additional
children gather and to increase buffer zones to upwards of
places where
74
2,500 feet.
IR. RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS IN FLORIDA
A. State Legislation

Florida is among the twenty states that have enacted statewide
residence restrictions on sex offenders. Florida's restrictions are unique.
While a majority of these states have enacted one statute to deal with a
single category of offenders,75 Florida has taken a dual-category approach,

fact that sex offenders tend to continue to commit assaults").
71. Imber, supranote 12, at 101.
72. Henderson, supra note 27, at 798-99 (stating that many supporters view statutes as
"prophylactic measures enacted to reduce the total number of sex offenses committed").
73. ATSA Policy Statement, supranote 13 (positing that "there is no research to support the
idea that residence restrictions prevent repeat sex crimes"); Levenson & Cotter, supra note 13, at
174-75 (finding that an overwhelming majority of sex offenders in Florida perceived residence
restrictions to be ineffective in altering the risk of reoffending).
74. See, e.g., H.B. 91,2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (proposing amendments to Florida's
law that: (1) increase the buffer zone from 1,000 feet to 2,500 feet; (2) include public school bus
stops; and (3) increase the number of affected sex offenders by including sex offenders whose
victims were under the age of 18); H.B. 157, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006) (proposing
amendments to Kentucky's law that would increase the buffer zone from 1,000 to 1,500 feet); S.B.
6, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006) (proposing amendments to Indiana's law that would remove
possibility of parole board exceptions and would require predators to wear electronic monitoring
devices). California legislators have turned to the initiative process in hopes of sweeping reforms
to statewide restrictions against sex offenders. Endorsed by Democrats and Republicans alike,
including Governor Schwarzenegger, Proposition 83 could verywell sparka national trend ifvoters
approve the new measure, which prohibits all released sex offenders from living within 2,000 feet
of a school or park and provides for lifetime monitoring through electronic tracking devices. See
Jennifer Warren, Sex Offender Crackdown Measure Ties into a NationalTrend, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
18, 2006, 2006 WLNR 16159743.
75. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) (2005) (applying residence prohibitions against
"sex offender[s] ...required to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1997, § 12-12901 et seq."); IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A (West 2005) (designating persons subject to the
provisions as "person[s] who [have] committed a criminal offense against a minor, or an aggravated
offense, sexually violent offense, or other relevant offense that involved a minor").
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providing for one set of restrictions applying to sex offenders76 and another
more stringent set of restrictions for a small group of sexual predators."
1. Restrictions Against General Sex Offenders
During the 2004 legislative session, the Florida Legislature passed a
law that prohibits certain sex offenders from residing "within 1,000 feet
of any school, day care center, park or playground."78 In tailoring the
statute to effectuate the goal of protecting children, these restrictions apply
only to those sex offenders committing offenses on or after October 1,
2004, whose victims were under the age of sixteen at the time of the
crime.79 Offenders who violate the law are subject to two potential
criminal penalties. A violator whose qualifying conviction was classified
as a first-degree felony or higher is charged with committing a thirddegree felony.8° A violator whose qualifying conviction was less than a
first-degree felony is charged with committing a first-degree
misdemeanor.8
On its face, § 794.065 works to both broaden and narrow the category
of offenders included within its grasp. First, these residence restrictions
apply regardless of whether a sex offender has served any time behind
bars.82 This broadens the scope of the statute, potentially including sex
offenders who cut deals to stay out of jail and offenders with suspended
sentences. Second, these residence restrictions apply only to those
offenders who were convicted of offenses committed on or after October
1, 2004.83 Thus, the statute applies prospectively, and thereby narrows the
category of offenders by exempting a whole host of past offenders from
76. FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2005).
77. Id. § 947.1405.
78. 2004 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2004-55 (West).
It is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a violation of s.
794.011, s. 800.04, s. 827.071, or s. 847.0145, regardless of whether adjudication
has been withheld, in which the victim of the offense was less than 16 years of
age, to reside within 1,000 feet of any school, day care center, park, or
playground.
FLA. STAT. § 794.065(1) (2005). The restrictions created under § 794.065 apply to sex offenders
convicted of sexual battery (§ 794.011); lewd or lascivious offenses (§ 800.04); sexual performance
by a child (§ 827.07 1); or selling or buying of minors (§ 847.0145). Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id."It is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a violation of s. 794.011, s.
800.04, s.827.071, or s. 847.0145, regardless of whether adjudicationhas been withheld." Id
(emphasis added)
83. Id. § 794.065(2).
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the restrictions.8 4
2. Restrictions Against Sexual Predators
Within the same bill, the Florida Legislature amended the Conditional
Release Program Act to include even stricter residence restrictions against
a smaller group of offenders labeled sexual predators.8 5 Originally drafted
in 1996, § 947.1405(7)(a) prohibited sexual predators subject to
conditional release supervision from "living within 1,000 feet of a school,
daycare center, park, playground, or other place where children regularly
congregate. '86 In 2004, the Florida Legislature added to § 947.1405(7)(a),
prohibiting sexual predators from living within 1,000 feet of a public
school bus stop. 87 Persons subject to these restrictions are those sex
offenders who were convicted of the same qualifying crimes included in
§ 794.065,88 and have been labeled sexual predators under § 775.21
because of their enhanced threat to society. 9 The restrictions under
§ 947.1405 apply to those sexual predators convicted of a crime committed
on or after October 1, 1995, whose victims were under the age of eighteen
at the time of the crime. 90
These restrictions are more severe than those placed on general sex
offenders. Sexual predators subject to § 947.1405 are still under the
supervision of the Department of Corrections. 9' Rather than going through
the courts, violations are assessed by the Parole Commission. 92 The most

84. The Florida Legislature likely limited the application of residence restrictions to future
offenders to ensure that the restrictions would withstand challenges that the restrictions amounted
to an ex post facto law. See FLA. SENATE STAFF, SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT
STATEMENT ON S.B. 120, 4-5 (Fla. 2004) (noting that FLA. STAT. § 794.065, as enacted, will not
face ex post facto challenges because it does not apply retroactively).
85. 2004 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2004-55 (West). "If the victim was under the age of 18,
a prohibition on living within 1,000 feet of a school, day care center, park, playground, designated
public school bus stop, or other place where children regularly congregate." FLA. STAT.
§ 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (2005) (emphasis added). In 2004, the Florida Department of Corrections
predicted that only about thirty-five offenders would be subject to the residence restrictions under
§ 947.1405(7)(a). Thompson, supranote 12, at B1.
86. 1996 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 96-388 (West).
87. FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (2005).
88. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing four different types of crimes).
89. FLA. STAT. § 775.21(3)(a) (2005). "Repeat sexual offenders, sexual offenders who use
physical violence, and sexual offenders who prey on children are sexual predators who present an
extreme threat to the public safety." Id.
90. Id. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2).
91. Id.
92. See id.
§ 947.141(4) (detailing the procedure by which the Parole Commission determines
the consequences when a sexual predator violates the terms of § 947.1405(7)(a)(2)). One potential
consequence of a violation is that a sexual predator may lose his right to continue in the Conditional
Release Program and return to prison to finish the remainder of his term. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss5/5

16

Wernick: In Accordance
with Public WITH
Outcry:
Zoning
Out Sex Offenders Throug
IN ACCORDANCE
A PUBLIC
OUTCRY

significant provision within the residence restrictions themselves is the
inclusion of public school bus stops and "other place[s] where children
regularly congregate" within the buffer zone.9 3 Considering that public
school bus stops are numerous and typically located in residential areas
where children live too far away to walk to school," restrictions faced by
sexual predators cover enormous ground and prohibit them from living in
some of Florida's most remote areas as well. 95
B. Local Ordinances
Towns, cities, counties, and other local governments around Florida
have jumped into the fray, enacting even stricter regulations than those
imposed by the State to effectively push these undesirable offenders out
of the community. Prompted in 2005 by the murder of Jessica Lunsford in
central Florida96 and the Millerdecision in April of that same year, 97 local
residence restrictions have appeared rapidly throughout the state.9"
Following the lead of the city of Miami Beach, 99 local governments in

93. Id. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2).
94. See id. § 234.01 (mandating Florida school boards to provide transportation for students
whose homes are more than a "reasonable walking distance" from the student's assigned school).
For further explanation, see FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 6A-3.001 (2006) (defining "reasonable
walking distance" as "any distance not more than two (2) miles between the home and school or
one and one-half(l 1/2) miles between the home and the assigned bus stop"). For information on
the sheer number of bus stops, see Thompson, supra note 12, at B I (stating that Pinellas County
alone has over 15,000 public school bus stops).
95. However, the legislature added a caveat to § 947.1405 regarding public school bus stops
that protects sexual predators who have pre-established residences. FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2)
(2005). While sexual predators subject to the Conditional Release Program are prohibited from
moving within 1,000 feet of an established bus stop, school districts are prohibited from creating
new bus stops and are required to move any existing bus stops within the same distance of any
predators already maintaining a residence before October 1, 2004. Id. Interestingly, this provision
creates reverse buffer zones against school districts, blocking off certain areas that otherwise may
be ideal candidates for public school bus stops. Thompson, supra note 12, at B I (detailing the
difficulties faced by school districts in locating new bus stops as a result of this law).
96. Manuel Roig-Franzia, Miami Beach MayorSeeks to Exclude Sex Offenders, WASH. POST,
Apr. 25, 2005, at A03 (discussing the murder of Jessica Lunsford, a nine-year-old girl from central
Florida who was found dead with her hands bound on Mar. 19, 2005).
97. Supra note 15 and accompanying text.
98. See FLA. H.R. STAFF, H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS OF H.B. 91, at 4 (2005) [hereinafter H.R.
STAFF ANALISYS OF H.B. 91 ] (stating that "[a] s of October 17, 2005, of the 153 municipalities that
responded [to the Committee's survey], 50 municipalities indicated that they had passed ordinances
and 14 had pending proposed ordinances"); Mike Carlson, Not in M~y City, ORLANDO WEEKLY,
Aug. 25, 2005, availableat http://www.orlandoweekly.com/features/story.asp?id=8250 (stating that
the City of Davie, on May 18, 2005, became the first city in Florida to formally enact a local
ordinance that prohibited sex offenders from living within 2,500 feet of schools).
99. Carlson, supra note 98 (stating that Miami Beach Mayor Alan Dermer began advocating
for a stricter local ordinance shortly after the death of Jessica Lunsford in March). Dermer proposed
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Florida have taken a much stricter approach to residence restrictions,
expanding the ban from the state-mandated 1,000 feet to 2,500 feet.'00 Like
the majority of local governments, the City of Miami Beach has created a
hybrid ordinance, placing prohibitions on general sex offenders more in
line with statewide restrictions against sexual predators. The city prohibits
sex offenders whose victims were under the age of sixteen from "living
within 2,500 feet of a school, designated public school bus stop, day care
center, park, playground, or other place[s] where children regularly
congregate."' l0 ' In addition, the city prohibits sex offenders from
establishing either a permanent or temporary residence within a restricted
zone. 102
While many local ordinances place additional restrictions on sex
offenders above and beyond those enacted by the State, there are a couple
of areas in which local ordinances are less restrictive. First, penalties
imposed upon violators are not as harsh. A majority of local governments
impose a small fine along with the possibility of sixty days in jail for a first
offense, while a second offense commands a higher fine and the possibility
of twelve months in jail.0 3 Second, local ordinances provide exceptions for

increasing the distance to 2,500 feet, based on the statewide exclusions for adult-entertainment
facilities. Id.
100. See, e.g., CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE § 70-402 (2005) (prohibiting sex
offenders whose victims were under the age of sixteen from establishing a permanent or temporary
residence "within 2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, day care center, park,
playground, or other place where children regularly congregate"); CITY OF WINTER PARK, FLA.,
ORDINANCE No. 2638-05 (2005) (prohibiting sexual offenders or predators from establishing a
permanent or temporary residence within 2,500 feet of any park, school, school bus stop, day-care
center, or playground).
101. CIr OF MIAMI BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE § 70-402(a) (2005). The City of Miami Beach
is one of many who have borrowed the terms "public school bus stop" and "other place where
children regularly congregate" from the State's residence restrictions against sexual predators. See
FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (2005).
102. CITY OF MIAmi BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE § 70-401.
Temporary residence means a place where the person abides, lodges, or
resides for a period of 14 or more days in the aggregate during any calendar year
and which is not the person's permanent address, or a place where the person
routinely abides, lodges, or resides for a period of four or more consecutive or
nonconsecutive days in any month and which is not the person's permanent
residence.
Id. State residence restrictions, conversely, merely prohibit sex offenders from residing .... and
the Florida legislature has not elaborated on what it means to reside somewhere. See FLA. STAT.
§ 794.065 (2005).
103. See, e.g., CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE § 70-402(c) (2005).
Penalties.A person who violates this section shall be punished by a fine not
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sex offenders who have established a permanent residence prior to the
enactment of the residence restrictions. There are also exceptions for
offenders who were prosecuted as juveniles, offenders who are still
juveniles, and offenders whose residence is brought into conflict with a
restricted area through the creation of a school, bus stop, or other childcentered facilities.1°4
In an attempt to find efficient ways to ensure that sex offenders do not
slip through the cracks, local governments prohibit landlords from
knowingly renting any residence located within a buffer zone to sex
offenders subject to residency restrictions. °5 The goal of these landlord
compliance provisions is to create a self-enforcement mechanism that
alleviates pressure on local law enforcement agencies. This purpose is
made clear by the fact that violators are typically only subject to code

exceeding $500.00 or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding 60 days, or by
both such fine and imprisonment; for a second or subsequent conviction of a
violation of this section, such person shall be punished by a fine not to exceed
$1,000.00 or imprisonment in the countyjail not more than 12 months, or by both
such fine and imprisonment.
Id.
104. See, e.g., CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE § 70-402(d) (2005). The ordinance
provides an exception for sex offenders when:
(1) The person established the permanent residence or temporary residence and
reported and registered the residence pursuant to F.S. § 775.21, 943.0435 or
944.607, prior to July 1, 2005.
(2) The person was a minor when he/she committed the offense and was not
convicted as an adult.
(3) The person is a minor.
(4) The school, designated public school bus stop or day care center within 2,500
of the persons permanent residence was opened after the person established the
permanent residence or temporary residence and reported and registered the
residence pursuant to F.S. § 775.21, 943.0435 or 944.607.
Id.
105. See, e.g., CITY OF NORTH LAUDERDALE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 38-93(a) (2005).
It is unlawful to let or rent any place, structure, or part thereof, trailer or other
conveyance, with the knowledge that it will be used as a permanent residence or
temporary residence by any person prohibited from establishing such permanent
residence o[r] temporary residence pursuant to s. 134.62 of this Code, if such
place, structure, or part thereof, trailer or other conveyance, is located within two
thousand five hundred (2500) feet of any school, designated public school bus
stop, day care center, park, playground, or other place where children regularly
congregate.
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10 6
enforcement provisions amounting to a slap on the wrist.
Local governments have enacted these residence restrictions under the
broad police powers conferred upon them by the State of Florida.'07 Local
governments cite many of the same concerns expressed by state
lawmakers: that sex offenders represent an extreme threat to public safety,
that offenders have a high risk of recidivism, that many sex crimes
involving children go unreported, and that the repercussions of these
crimes come at an unbearable cost to victims and society as a whole." 8
Aiming to provide maximum protection to their citizens, local legislative
bodies have borrowed state regulatory language barring adultentertainment facilities within 2,500 feet of schools 9 as a basis for
expanding residence restrictions beyond the 1,000-foot statewide
restrictions."0

V. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO RESIDENCE
RESTRICTIONS: DOE V. MILLER

While relatively new, residence restrictions have thus far withstood
judicial scrutiny. State and federal courts have thrown out challenges for
lack of standing,"' and several state courts of last resort have upheld the
legitimacy of residence restrictions against a variety of different
constitutional challenges. 1 2 In Doe v. Miller, the lone challenge to reach

106. See, e.g., CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE § 70-403(b) (2005) (stating that
violations are subject to code violation penalties).
107. See FLA. CONST. art VIII, § 2(b). "Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and
proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions
and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes except as
otherwise provided by law." Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 166.021(3) (2005).
108. The legislature recognizes that pursuant to the grant of power set forth in Art. VIII, § 2(b)
of the Florida Constitution, the legislative body of each municipality has the power to enact
legislation concerning any subject matter upon which the state legislature may act. FLA. STAT.
§ 166.021(3); see, e.g., CITY OF NORTH LAUDERDALE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 38-90(a)
(2005).
109. FLA. STAT. § 847.0134 (2005).
110. See CITY OF CORAL SPRINGS, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 14-1 (2005).
111. See, e.g., Coston v. Petro, 398 F. Supp. 2d 878, 883 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (holding that
plaintiffoffenders did not have standing to bring § 1983 challenge because they lived in an area not
affected by residence restrictions); Boyd v. State, CR-04-0963 2006 WL 250832 (Ala. Crim. App.
Feb. 3, 2006) (holding that defendant lacked standing to challenge the Alabama restrictions for
violating fundamental rights to enjoy the privacy of marriage because the defendant failed to
introduce evidence that he was married).
112. See, e.g., State v. Seering, 701 N.W. 2d 655, 670 (Iowa 2005) (holding that Iowa's statute
was not unconstitutional because the residency restrictions did not deprive a sex offender of his
constitutionally protected rights); Mann v. State, 603 S.E.2d 283,285-86 (Ga. 2004) (holding that
the application of Georgia statute to the petitioner did not amount to a takings violation, that the
phrase child-care facility was not void for vagueness, and that the statute was not overly broad);
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a federal circuit court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that nothing in the Constitution prevented Iowa from using its
police powers to establish residence restrictions against sex offenders in
furtherance of the health and safety of the state's citizens." 3
In 2002, Iowa enacted legislation that prohibited sex offenders
convicted of certain offenses against a minor" 4 from residing within 2,000
feet of a school or registered child-care facility. "'Agroup of sex offenders
in Iowa brought a class action suit in federal district court to challenge the
legitimacy of Iowa's new statewide residence restrictions. 6 Declaring the
restrictions unconstitutional, the district court issued a permanent
injunction barring enforcement of the law." 7 However, on April 29, 2005,
a three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit, in Doe v. Miller, reversed the
lower court's decision and upheld Iowa's statute as a valid use of the
state's police powers. "8 Specifically, the court held that the Iowa statewide
residence restrictions did not violate procedural due process l" 9 or
121
substantive due process, 2 ' and did not amount to self-incrimination
or
22
Clause.1
Facto
Post
Ex
a retroactive law in violation of the
While Miller is an important case for defending the legitimacy of these
laws, the legality of residence restrictions is still the subject of much
debate. 1 3 First, Miller was not a unanimous decision.124 In his dissent,

Lee v. State, 895 So. 2d 1038, 1044 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (holding that 2,000 foot residence
restrictions against sex offenders was nonpunitive and therefore, the retroactive application did not
constitute a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause).
113. Miller, 405 F.3d at 704.
114. IOWA CODE § 692A.2A (1) (2002) (stating that the restrictions apply to "a person who
has committed a criminal offense against a minor, or an aggravated offense, sexually violent
offense, or other relevant offense that involved a minor").
115. Id. § 692A.2A (2).
116. Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d. 844, 847 (S.D. Iowa 2004).
117. Id. at 880.
118. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2005). The Eighth Circuit declined to hear the
case en banc, Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005), and the U.S. Supreme Court denied
certiorari, Doe v. Miller, 126 S. Ct. 757 (2005).
119. Miller, 405 F.3d at 709.
120. Id. at 716 ("[W]e are not persuaded that the means selected to pursue the State's
legitimate interest are without rational basis.").
121. Id.
122. Id. at 723.
123. See H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS OF H.B. 91, supra note 98, at 8-9 (2005) (stating that a
proposed increase in Florida's statewide residence restrictions to 2,500 feet will likely invite a
constitutional challenge on grounds that the statute amounts to a violation of the Ex Post Facto
Clause); Michael J. Duster, Note, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: State Attempts to Banish Sex
Offenders, 53 DRAKE L. REv. 711,778-79 (2005) (asserting that while states have acted with good
intentions, residence restrictions against sex offenders have "swept away constitutional protections
of substantive due process, the prohibition on ex post facto laws, and adequate notice guaranteed
by procedural due process"); Henderson, supra note 27, at 811-12 (arguing that there is no
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Judge Michael Melloy pointed to the ex postfacto challenge as a serious
threat to the legitimacy of these restrictions, and sowed the seeds of a
future majority opinion.'25 Second, Miller is only binding on those seven
mid-western states within the Eighth Circuit's reach. 2 6 Finally, the
Supreme Court may be waiting for the issue to percolate in the lower
courts before handpicking a case.'27 In light of these possibilities, the
constitutional issues at stake in Miller are worthy of further discussion.
A. ProceduralDue Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that
"no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law."' 28 Procedural due process protection is primarily
concerned with ensuring that when laws infringe on protected rights of
individuals, the government provides adequate procedural safeguards to
ensure fairness to those punished or affected by the laws.'2 9 In analyzing
Iowa's residence restrictions, the court in Miller found that the restrictions
did not deny sex offenders due process of the law. 3 0
After implicitly recognizing a liberty interest in the right to choose
one's residence,' 3 ' the Miller court addressed whether the residence

supporting evidence that residence restrictions will prevent re-offenses and that state statutes apply
unequally to different categories of sex offenders); cf supra note 12 (summarizing the position of
proponents of residence restrictions).
124. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 705.
125. See id. at 723-26 (Melloy, J., dissenting). Judge Melloy found the Iowa statute to be a
punitive law in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, but otherwise joined the majority opinion.
Id. at 723.
126. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals hears appeals from federal district courts located in
Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota. United States
Courts, U.S. Courts of Appeals, http://www.uscourts.gov/courtlinks (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
127. See H. W. PERRY JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 249 (1991) (finding that the Supreme Court, in deciding whether to grant
certiorari, often looks favorably upon a case that has had a chance to percolate in the federal
appellate courts).
128. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
129. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,259 (1978) ("Procedural due process rules are meant
to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life,
liberty, or property.").
130. Miller, 405 F.3d at 709.
131. The first question in every procedural due process challenge is whether the government
has deprived the individual of a protected interest in property or liberty. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). Since failure to find a deprivation of a protected liberty
interest would have relieved the State from any requirement to provide due process, the court would
not have had reason to evaluate the challenges brought by respondents. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693, 700-01 (1976) (stating that due process is not required unless a deprivation of property or
liberty interest has been found).
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restrictions failed to provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct.' 32
Respondents claimed that the statute was void for vagueness because
certain cities in Iowa were unable to provide sex offenders with full
information on the location of restricted areas 33 and that measuring 2,000foot buffer zones was a difficult and uncertain process.' 34 The court
rejected this challenge, stating that potential problems do not render the
entire statute unconstitutional on its face.' 35 The court reasoned that while
individual sex offenders may, in practice, have a legitimate challenge as
applied to them, the possibility that a sex offender may unknowingly
violate the statute because of
incomplete information was not enough to
13 6
invalidate the entire statute.
The Miller court next addressed the claim that the Iowa statute violated
procedural due process safeguards by depriving sex offenders of a hearing
to consider the dangerousness of individuals before subjecting them to
residence restrictions.' 37 Ordinarily, an individual must be given an
opportunity to be heard before he is deprived of a property or liberty
interest. 38
' However, in ConnecticutDepartmentofPublicSafety v. Doe,'39
the Supreme Court stated that "due process does not entitle [a sex
offender] to a hearing to establish a fact that is not material under the
statute."' 4 Furthermore, procedural due process does not prohibit states
from creating classifications among sex offenders. 1 ' Since the Iowa
statute applied equally to all sex offenders convicted of crimes against
minors regardless of present or future dangerousness, the court found that
providing individuals with an opportunity for a hearing would be
unnecessary.' 42
Opponents of residence restrictions argue that the limitations placed
upon sex offenders' housing options and the strain on familial relations
amount to a deprivation of liberty and require significant procedural
132. Miller, 405 F.3d at 708.
133. Id.
134. Id.Respondents argued that measuring distances between potential residences and
restricted areas "as the crow flies"--as provided in the state statute-created uncertainty in
application. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.at 709.
138. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
139. 538 U.S. 1 (2003).
140. Id.at 7.
141. Miller, 405 F. 3d at 709 (citing Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)).
142. Id.Assuming that the classification created by the state legislature is legitimate, the court
asserted that the state legislature was not required to create exemptions to the legislative
classification. Id.The court did suggest that an exemption might be necessary if respondents could
establish that the creation of this classification infringed upon a substantive right under another
provision of the Constitution. Id.
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safeguards. 43 Commentators point to Kansas v. Hendricks'4"in arguing
that a conviction for one of a wide range of sex offenses standing alone
should not be enough to satisfy procedural due process.'45 However, the
statute at issue in Hendricks imposed civil commitment on sex offenders,
thus depriving them of their total liberty interest. 46 Residence restrictions
may force sex offenders to look for housing in less desirable areas,' 47 but
these laws do not restrict offenders from engaging in daily activities nor
do they prevent offenders from living with family members in homes
located outside of established buffer zones.
Opponents of residence restrictions have made a stronger argument
regarding the failure of state statutes to provide adequate notice. First, both
sex offenders subject to restrictions and local officials have had difficulty
in ascertaining which areas are off-limits to sex offenders. 48 Second,
opponents argue that vague language included in state statutes fails to
provide adequate notice of restricted areas. 49 For example, statewide
restrictions in Texas prohibit sex offenders from residing "within 1,000
feet of a premises where children commonly gather."' 5 ° Left to the
imagination, these areas could encompass a variety of community
facilities, including shopping centers, gymnasiums, and churches.
Recognition by the Eighth Circuit in Miller that statewide residence
restrictions may be invalid as applied leaves statewide restrictions
vulnerable in the future. Clearly, this language is dicta. However, another
circuit may borrow this sentiment to strike down residence restrictions
elsewhere that fail to provide clear information regarding the parameters
of prohibited conduct.
B. Substantive Due Process
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects the substantive aspects of liberty against arbitrary and
unreasonable government action regardless of the fairness of procedures
143. Id. at 706.
144. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
145. Duster, supra note 123, at 762 (suggesting that the Court in Hendricks upheld the civil
commitment statutes because there were provisions in place to commit only those offenders found
to be most likely to reoffend, and that the Court would not have upheld the Kansas statute had it
applied across the board to all offenders with convictions).
146. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356.
147. Miller, 405 F.3d at 706 (stating that plaintiffs testified they had difficulty finding suitable
housing outside of the 2,000-foot restricted areas, and that many of the available housing units were
in rural parts of the state).
148. Duster, supranote 123, at 765-66 (summarizing the difficulties in knowing which areas
are subject to residence restrictions because of a lack of current maps and other resources).
149. Id. at 766 (discussing vague language in the Georgia statute).
150. TEx. CODE CRIM.PRoc. ANN. art. 42.12(13B) (Vernon 2005).
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used. 5' Under the doctrine of substantive due process, courts grant broad
deference to legislative judgments and typically require that laws be
merely rational in relation to a legitimate purpose.152 But when legislation
infringes on fundamental rights, the state must narrowly tailor regulations
"to serve a compelling state interest."' 53 Opponents of residence
restrictions against sex offenders have asserted that these laws infringe on
the right to privacy, the right to travel, and the right to live where one
chooses.1 54 In Miller, the Eighth Circuit determined that the Iowa
restrictions did not implicate any fundamental
rights,' 55 and upheld the
56
test.
basis
rational
the
statute under
1. Right to Privacy Regarding Family Life
The Miller court rejected the claim that Iowa's residence restrictions
intrude on the right to privacy concerning family life."57 Respondents
relied on a line of Supreme Court cases that have found "intimate human
relationships" to be so central to the concept of freedom that they deserve
the utmost protection from government interference."5 ' Recognizing that
the doctrine ofjudicial restraint requires caution in extending the arena of
fundamental rights, 59 the court rejected respondents' claim, stating that the
Iowa statute did not directly intrude on "the family relationship."'"
While the Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental right in
personal choices relating to marriage and family life, strict scrutiny is not

151. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (describing the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause that protects individual liberty against 'certain
government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them."')
(quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
152. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 222 (1953) (stating that
due process provides broad deference to government in choosing the ways and means by which it
carries out its policies).
153. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,301-02 (1993). Only fundamental rights and liberties which
are "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist
if they were sacrificed' qualify for the protection of strict scrutiny. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
154. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 709 (8th Cir. 2005).
155. Id. at 710.
156. Id. at 714-16.
157. Id. at 709.
158. See id. at 709-10 (summarizing the development of the fundamental right to privacy
regarding family relationships). Respondents leaned heavily on the ruling in Moore v. City ofEast
Cleveland, in which the Court, in rejecting a law that prevented a grandmother from residing with
her two grandsons, stated that "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life
is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Moore
v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-99 (1977).
159. Miller, 405 F.3d at 710 (citing Flores, 507 U.S. at 302).
160. Id. at710.
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required when a regulation merely has "an incidental or unintended effect
on the family."'' In Griswold v. Connecticut,162 the Court applied strict
scrutiny to a state statute that directly imposed on the privacy of marriage
by forbidding the use of contraceptives by a married couple. 63
' Conversely,
in Miller, the court stated that the Iowa statute did not directly operate to
regulate family life nor did it prevent families from living together. 1"
While the court recognized that some sex offenders were prevented from
living in preferred locations,'65 the
court asserted that the statute does not
66
restrict who may live together.1
2. Right to Travel
The Eighth Circuit, in Miller,rejected respondents' claim that the Iowa
residence restrictions violate any fundamental right to travel.'67 Leaning
168
on Supreme Court recognition of the right to interstate travel,
respondents argued that because the Iowa residence restrictions
substantially infringe on the ability of sex offenders to establish
residences, the law erects an unconstitutional barrier to offenders' right to
migrate from other states to Iowa. 69 The court disagreed, stating
that the
170
Iowa statute did not erect a barrier to interstate movement.
The Miller court refused to extend the fundamental right to travel
beyond its strict application.' 7' In Saenz v. Roe, 172 the Supreme Court

161. Id. (citing Hameetman v. City of Chicago, 776 F.2d 636, 643 (7th Cir. 1985)).
162. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
163. Id. at 485.
164. Miller, 405 F.3d at 711 (distinguishing the Iowa statute from the regulations involved in
Moore and Griswold).
165. Id.The court acknowledged that some offenders could not reside with family members
who had established residences within restricted buffer zones while others were forced to move as
far as forty-five miles from a preferred location. Id.However, the court found these to be merely
incidental results of the statute. Id.
166. Id.at 710. The Iowa Supreme Court rejected a similar challenge to the Iowa residence
restrictions, finding that the law did not "absolutely prevent" husband and wife from living
together. State v. Seering, 701 N.W. 2d 655, 663 (Iowa 2005). While the Seering court purported
to be sympathetic to the difficulties arising out of the residence restrictions on sex offenders and
their families, the court stated that "the difficulties result from a social or political judgment that
must be made by the legislature and not this court." Id.at 664.
167. Miller, 405 F.3d at 711.
168. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999) (stating that the right to interstate travel
encompasses "the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another state, the right to be
treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second
state, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like
other citizens of that State.").
169. Miller, 405 F.3d at 711.
170. Id. at712.
171. See id.at 712 (asserting that to recognize an implication of the fundamental right to
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found that a regulation violated the fundamental right to travel because it
denied non-residents the same welfare benefits that were afforded to instate residents.' 73 In distinguishing the Iowa residence restrictions from the
regulation in Saenz, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that Iowa's statute did not
treat visitors to Iowa differently than residents, nor did it treat potential
residents differently than current residents.1 74 The court rejected an
alternative claim that the statute intruded on the right to intrastate travel,
stating that even if the court acknowledged such a dubious right, 75 the
right to intrastate travel is correlative to the right
to interstate travel, and
76
analysis.1
court's
the
under
fail
would
therefore
Opponents argue that a literal interpretation of statewide restrictions
prohibits visiting sex offenders from sleeping even a single night within
a residential buffer zone and therefore these restrictions present a more
significant intrusion on the right to travel than recognized by the Miller
court.177 Under Iowa's statute, the term "residence" is defined as "the place
where a person sleeps, which may include more than one location, and
may be mobile or transitory. "178 A literal application could potentially
place homeless shelters and rehabilitation centers off limits or simply scare
sex offenders into avoiding the state altogether. 79 The Miller court
discarded these claims, pointing to the fact that respondents were current
and potential residents rather than travelers. 80 However, the court implied
that this line of argument could be effective should another group of sex
offenders challenge Iowa's restrictions or other state restrictions that have
included temporary residences through statutory language.' 8 '

interstate travel in considering the Iowa residence restrictions would be an unwarranted extension
beyond the Supreme Court's previous case law).
172. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
173. Id. at 505-07.
174. Miller, 405 F.3d at 712. The court stated that all offenders were treated equally as harsh.
Id.
175. While the right to interstate travel has consistently been recognized as a fundamental
right, there is a circuit split on the status of the right to intrastate travel. Compare Lutz v. City of
York, 899 F.2d 255, 265-66 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that a city ordinance that prohibited cruising
on certain streets violated a fundamental right to intrastate travel), with Doe v. City of Lafayette,
377 F.3d 757, 770-71 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that a city ordinance banning sex offenders from
entering public parks did not implicate any right to intrastate travel).
176. Miller, 405 F.3d at 713.
177. Duster, supranote 123, at 750-5 1.
178. IOWA CODE § 692A.1(8) (2005).
179. Duster, supranote 123, at 750-51 ("A sex offender simply wanting to travel through the
State might be compelled to avoid Iowa altogether lest he stop for the night at an acquaintance's
home or a motel and thereby establish an unlawful residence by unwittingly falling asleep.").
180. Miller, 405 F.3d at 712 n.3.
181. See id. (questioning whether concerns over temporary housing were applicable to the
Respondents in the class action before the court).
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3. Right to Live Where One Chooses
Reviving an argument that the Eighth Circuit had previously rejected
82
some thirty years ago in Prostrollo v. University of South Dakota,"
respondents in Miller argued that residence restrictions intruded on the
' The Miller court noted that
fundamental right to live where one chooses. 83
courts should proceed with caution in deciding whether to expand the
arena of fundamental rights.'84 Declining to overturn Prostrollo,the court
stated that respondents failed to show that the right to live where one
chooses was either "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"
or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" in accordance with the test
established by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg.8 5
But while the Miller court rejected this most intriguing substantive due
process challenge, commentators have continued to press the issue.'86
First, commentators claim that aside from discriminatory housing laws that
have long been abandoned, there is no historical precedent permitting
states from restraining individuals from living in homes they can otherwise
afford to own.' 87 Additionally, the right to live where one pleases is said
to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty because of the basic role
that private property rights play in American democracy'88 and because of

182. 507 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1974). The Eighth Circuit stated that "we cannot agree that the
right to choose one's place of residence is necessarily a fundamental right." Id.at 781.
183. Miller, 405 F.3d at 713.
184. Id. at 713-14. The Supreme Court has placed great caution on the way in which courts
proceed in matters concerning substantive due process because "[b]y extending constitutional
protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the
arena of public debate and legislative action." Id. at 714 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).
185. Id. at 714 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21).
186. See Bernard H. Siegan, Smart Growth andOtherInfirmitiesofLand Use Control,38 SAN
DiEGO L. REV. 693, 696 (2001). In criticizing smart growth techniques-recent land use policies
that restrict suburban development in favor of high-density urban development-Professor Siegan
states that government bodies should not be allowed to infringe on individuals' "fundamental
freedom to move and settle where they choose." Id.
187. See Lior Strahilevitz, Sex Offender Residency Restrictions and the Right to Live Where
You Want, PRAWFSBLAWG, Aug. 3, 2005, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/
2005/08/sex-offenderre.html (stating that aside from banishment laws and restraining orders, there
is "little historical precedent for states preventing citizens from living in homes they can afford to
buy, let alone rendering entire cities off limits to undesirables").
188. See Richard Epstein, Propertyas a FundamentalCivil Right, 29 CAL. W. L. Rnv. 187,
187 (1992) (stating that in many circles, property rights are considered fundamental to our society).
Professor Epstein cites Justice Bushrod Washington's opinion in an early nineteenth century case
in which Justice Washington states, riding circuit, that fundamental rights under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause may include "the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and
possess property of every kind. .. , [and] to take, hold and dispose of property." Corfield v.
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the inherently undemocratic nature of government-mandated housing.189
This argument misapplies both prongs of the Glucksberg test.
Regarding the first prong, commentators incorrectly attempt to shift the
burden onto the government to prove that there is a long history of
restrictions against choice of residence. Secondly, judicial approval of
zoning and land use regulations 9 ' has long confirmed that private property
rights are not recognized by the Court as fundamental rights under the U.S.
Constitution.' While the right to continued enjoyment of private property
192
is one that the framers surely considered in drafting the Takings Clause,
as well as the Due Process Clause,'93 nowhere in the Constitution does it
create a right to enjoy property that one does not yet own. If states and
local governments are capable of crafting zoning ordinances in such a way
to prohibit the future use of property for residential purposes altogether,
then it seems highly unlikely that restrictions on sex offenders shopping
for a new neighborhood would be so egregious such that "neither liberty
nor justice would exist."' 94 Surely then, the right to choice of residence
cannot be inherent in the concept of ordered liberty. Furthermore,
opponents of residence restrictions, including respondents in Miller, cite
no case law to support the notion that this right is fundamental. 95
4. Rational Basis Review
After finding no basis to elevate scrutiny under substantive due process
analysis, the Miller court analyzed Iowa's residence restrictions to see if
the restrictions "rationally advance some legitimate governmental
purpose."' 96 Respondents had contended that even if the court declined to

Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
189. See Strahilevitz, supra note 187 (stating that "[g]overnment-mandated ghetto-ization
is... a hallmark of unfree societies").
190. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (holding that the
Village of Euclid's zoning ordinance was valid because it was not unreasonable or arbitrary in
relation to its police powers).
191. See Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid at Threescore Years and Ten: Is This the Twilight of
EnvironmentalandLand-UseRegulation?,30 U. RICH. L. REV. 961,994 (1996) (stating that courts
do not view the right to own and use private property as a fundamental right under the Federal
Constitution).
192. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
193. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ... ").
194. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S., 319, 325-26 (1937).
195. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 713-14 (8th Cir. 2005). As the Supreme Court stated
in Flores, "[t]he mere novelty of such a claim is reason enough to doubt that substantive due
process sustains it." Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993).
196. Miller, 405 F.3d at 714-16 (quoting Flores, 507 U.S. at 306).
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strictly scrutinize the Iowa statute, the restrictions were irrational. 97
' While
admitting that the State had identified a highly legitimate interest in
attempting to protect the safety of children,'98 respondents argued that
there was no scientific evidence to demonstrate that prohibiting sex
offenders from living within 2,000 feet of a school or child-care facility
would further this interest. 99 The court rejected this contention, stating
that the chosen residency restrictions were reasonable in light of the
serious threat posed by sex offenders to the safety and welfare of
children.2 °°
The court's reasoning confirms that even when a statutory regulation
is suspect, courts will defer to legislative judgment as long as there is a
shred of reasonableness present.20 ' Considering that twelve other states had
enacted residence restrictions at the time, the court found that although
there was evidence doubting the link between residential proximity and a
sex offender's likelihood of reoffending, 2 the Iowa Legislature acted with
proper authority in weighing the credibility of the evidence.2 3 In
evaluating the classification created by the statute, the court noted that the
legislature was properly situated to arrive at a distance requirement to be
used in the creation of buffer zones, 20 4 and found nothing wrong with
grouping sex offenders together given evidence of sex offenders' high rate
of recidivism. 20 5 The court concluded by summarizing the essence of
rational basis review: that courts will not find a regulation when, as in
Miller, policymakers employ "common sense" in imposing means to

197. Id. at 714.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. The court stated that "where precise statistical data is unavailable and human behavior
is necessarily unpredictable," the state legislature has the authority to determine the best course of
action to protect the interests of its citizens. Id.
201. See id. at 714-16 (concluding that the residence restrictions created by the Iowa
Legislature were not without a rational basis despite a lack of evidence as to their potential
effectiveness). Furthermore, in Jones v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that when a
legislature "undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative
options must be especially broad and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation." 463 U.S.
354, 370 (1983).
202. Miller, 405 F.3d at 714-16. The court acknowledged that a Minnesota Department of
Corrections study found no evidence that residential proximity had any correlation with a sex
offender's likelihood to commit another offense. Id.at 714.
203. Id.
204. Id.The court noted that the decision to provide for 2,000-foot buffer zones was the sort
of task for which the legislature was well suited. Id.
205. Id. at 715-16. The court looked specifically at recent Supreme Court opinions addressing
restrictions placed on sex offenders in light of high rates of recidivism. See Conn. Dep't of Pub.
Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1,4 (2003) ("When convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much
more likely than any other offender to be re-arrested for a new rape or sexual assault.").
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effectuate a legitimate interest.
Did the Miller court turn a blind eye to evidence that residence
restrictions have no effect on reducing recidivism? The court declined to
give much weight to evidence of lower-than-expected recidivism rates,
noting that residence restrictions had not been in place long enough to
collect adequate empirical evidence and characterizing the evidence
brought forth as speculative at best. 20 7 Though recent studies have
suggested rates of recidivism for sex offenders are much lower than once
believed, as discussed further in Part V, courts are extremely deferential
to legislative decision-making under the rational basis test.

C. Self-Incrimination
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects
persons against providing testimonial information that may be used against
them in a criminal prosecution.2 8 While a court will invalidate a law that
"compels testimony by threatening to inflict ...sanctions unless the...
privilege is surrendered,, 2 9 it must also be clear that a real and appreciable
danger of incrimination exists.2"'
Respondents in Miller argued that Iowa's residence restrictions, in
combination with state registration requirements, violated the Fifth
Amendment because they forced sex offenders to incriminate themselves
or face punishment for failure to register.2 1 The court rejected this
challenge, stating that while Iowa's registration requirements allegedly
compel testimonial statements that could incriminate a sex offender living
in a restricted zone,212 Iowa's residence restrictions merely limit where a
sex offender may reside.1 3 Rather than treat these two laws as a uniform

206. Miller,405 F.3d at 716. Noting that there was no evidence that the Iowa legislature acted
"merely on negative attitudes toward... or a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group,"
the court found no reason to deviate from deference to legislative decisions under rational basis
review. Id.
207. Id. at 714. Interestingly, the court also suggested that Iowa's decision to pass residence
restrictions was rational considering the fact that twelve other states had enacted their own set of
restrictions. Id. While Iowa may have truly believed that residence restrictions would help prevent
sex crimes against children, the fact that "every other state is doing it" is not a convincing
justification.
208. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
209. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 804-05 (1977) (holding that a state may not
compel testimony by a defendant concerning the conduct of his public office, although a state may
use evidence derived from other sources in the prosecution).
210. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48 (1968).
211. Miller, 405 F.3d at 716.
212. Under a separate statute, Iowa requires sex offenders to register their address with the
appropriate county sheriff's office. IOWA CODE § 692.2 (2005).
213. Miller, 405 F.3d at 716.
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regulatory scheme, the court treated residence restrictions separately.
Under this strict interpretation, the court distinguished previous cases in
which the Supreme Court had found violations of the Self-Incrimination
Clause.2" 4 The court discerned that while courts may invalidate registration
requirements that create a real and appreciable hazard of selfincrimination, the underlying substantive law is not, by itself,
unconstitutional.2 5
After suggesting that the intended target should have been the
registration requirements, the Miller court asserted that a selfincrimination challenge to the registration requirements would be premature. 2 Evidence showed that local officials had taken a flexible
approach to enforcement by giving sex offenders time to find alternative
housing; 217 consequently, sex offenders would have difficulties proving
that there is a real and appreciable hazard of self-incrimination.
While the Miller court rejected the self-incrimination challenge, the
court left the door open for future challenges. Hypothetically, if a sex
offender registers an address that violates residence restrictions and is then
prosecuted based on the information provided, without being given a
chance to move to an unrestricted area, the issue of self-incrimination
becomes ripe.218 Considering that all fifty states now have registration
requirements, 219 each state would be wise to ensure that its local law
enforcement officials continue to provide sex offenders with an
opportunity to move out of non-conforming residences before charging
offenders with violating the statute.
D. Ex PostFacto Laws
Article I, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution prevents states from enacting
laws that seek to retroactively increase the punishment for a crime that has
already been committed.22 In analyzing whether a state law violates the
Ex Post Facto Clause, courts look at whether the law operates as a
214. Id. at 716-17. For example, the court distinguished a case in which the Supreme Court
held that requirements for payment of tax on marijuana imports violated the Self-Incrimination
Clause, but did not suggest that laws criminalizing possession of marijuana were illegal. See Leary
v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 29 (1969).
215. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 716-17 (asserting that in previous cases, the Supreme Court
narrowly tailored the holdings in Self-Incrimination Clause challenges to merely prohibit
compulsion of registration and tax payment provisions for persons engaged in illegal activities).
The court stated that in all of these cases the Supreme Court did not mean to imply that the SelfIncrimination Clause rendered the substantive law illegal. Id.
216. Id. at 717.
217. Id. at 717 n.5.
218. Id. at 717-18.
219. See supranote 39 and accompanying text.
220. Miller, 405 F.3d at 718.
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punishment. If the legislature intended to enact a criminal punishment, that
law is automatically deemed to be punitive and unconstitutional.2"'
However, if the legislature intended to create a civil regulatory measure,
then the law will be presumed to be valid unless it is excessively
punitive."'
While conceding that the Iowa Legislature intended to enact a civil
statutory scheme, respondents in Miller argued that residence restrictions
against sex offenders were so punitive as to amount to retroactive
punishment.22 3 A majority of the three-judge panel rejected this contention,
concluding that respondents failed to carry their burden of proof.224 After
acknowledging that the purpose behind the statewide residence restrictions
was to protect the health and safety of Iowa's citizens, the majority used
the five guideposts from Smith v. Doe225 to dismantle the notion that the
Iowa statewide restrictions were excessively punitive.226
First, the majority rejected the argument that the restrictions amounted
to banishment,"' a traditionally recognized form of punishment. 2 8 The
majority reasoned that unlike banishment, residence restrictions do not
expel offenders from their communities, 229 and because of the novelty of
residence restrictions, there was no historical basis for finding these laws
to be traditionally punitive.23° Second, the majority stated that the
restrictions did not act primarily to promote the traditional aims of
punishment. 31 While the majority agreed that the law could have both a
deterrent and retributive effect, the primary purpose of the residence

221. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003).
222. Id. Laws that are civil will nevertheless be invalidated when found to be "'so punitive
either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's) intention' to deem it 'civil."' Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49
(1980)).
223. Miller, 405 F.3d at 718.
224. See id. at 718-23 (finding that the residence restrictions withstood the five-factor Ex Post
Facto Clause analysis).
225. 538 U.S. at 92.
226. Miller, 405 F.3d at 719. The court detailed the five factors adopted by the Supreme Court
in Smith to determine whether a law has a punitive effect: "whether the law has been regarded in
our history and traditions as punishment, whether it promotes the traditional aims of punishment,
whether it imposes an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has a rational connection to a
nonpunitive purpose, and whether it is excessive with respect to that purpose." Id.
227. Id. In Smith, the Supreme Court stated that historically, banished offenders were
"expelled from the community" and not allowed to return. Smith, 538 U.S. at 98.
228. Miller, 405 F.3d at 719 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 98).
229. Id. Under the Iowa statute, sex offenders are not prevented from going about their daily
activities, traveling through, or conducting business transactions in areas surrounding schools or
child-care facilities. Id.
230. Id. at 720.
231. Id.
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restrictions was to protect the safety of children.2 32 Next, the majority
considered whether the restrictions "impose[d] an affirmative disability or
restraint., 233 While the majority found residence restrictions to have a
disabling effect, 23 4 it balanced the degree of restraint against the
legislature's non-punitive purpose, 235 and ultimately deferred to the final,
dual-factor inquiry of rationality. 236 The majority concluded that the
restrictions were rationally related to a legitimate purpose 237 and were not
excessive in relation to that purpose.238 Specifically, the majority validated
the categorical regulation of sex offenders 239 and the legislature's decision
to apply 2,000-foot buffer zones.24°
In his dissent from the holding regarding the ex post facto challenge,
Judge Melloy concluded that Iowa's residence restrictions were
excessively punitive in effect, and should not be applied to sex offenders
who committed crimes prior to enactment of the law.24 ' Judge Melloy took

232. Id.The majority first asserted that while Iowa's residence restrictions could have a
deterrent effect, the primary purpose behind the law was to reduce the temptation for sex offenders
to reoffend. Id.Similarly, the majority found that while the restrictions may have a retributive effect
if they happened to parallel a sex offender's degree of wrongdoing in application, this effect would
merely be incidental. Id.Furthermore, the Supreme Court has warned against giving too much
weight to this factor, considering that despite their purpose, many, if not most, regulations have a
deterrent effect. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 102.
233. Miller, 405 F.3d at 720.
234. Id. at 721. Respondents presented evidence that the statute prohibited some sex offenders
from otherwise living with family members and spouses in areas covered by the residence
restrictions. Id.
235. Id. As the Supreme Court did in Smith and Hendricks, the majority "considered the
degree of the restraint involved in light of the legislature's countervailing nonpunitive purpose."
Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. Leaning on findings in Smith that sex offenders have a high risk of recidivism, the
majority asserted that the legislature could reasonably believe that residence restrictions would be
an effective measure for preventing new sex offenses against children. Id.
238. Id. at 721-23. In addressing what the majority titled "the most significant factor," the
court concluded that "the Does have not established the 'clearest proof' that Iowa's choice is
excessive in relation to its legitimate regulatory purpose, such that a statute designed to be
nonpunitive... should be considered retroactive criminal punishment." Id. at 723.
239. Id. at 721. The majority asserted that "[tlhe Ex Post Facto Clause does not preclude a
State from making reasonable categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should
entail particular regulatory consequences." Id. (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003)).
The majority concluded that a categorical rule against sex offenders would not be excessive
because among other reasons, the legislature is not required to narrowly tailor the restrictions to
meet the "'excessiveness' prong of the ex post facto analysis." Id. at 722.
240. Id.at 722-23. Noting that the Iowa statute was one of the first of its kind in the nation and
the difficulties in determining a proper distance requirement, the majority chose not to disturb the
legislature's decision. Id.
241. Id.at 723-25 (Melloy, J., dissenting) (finding four out of five factors weighed in favor
of an ex post facto violation).
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a more liberal approach to the historical punishment inquiry. He found that
while Iowa's residence restrictions did not expel sex offenders completely,
the restrictions amounted to partial banishment because sex offenders were
stigmatized242 and could not find housing at all in certain cities.243 He then
determined that Iowa's law effectuated the traditional notion of
deterrence. 244 Unlike the majority, Judge Melloy argued that the
affirmative disability imposed by the restrictions could not be
overlooked.24 Finally, while Judge Melloy agreed that there was a rational
connection at play,246 he argued that the restrictions were excessive in
relation to the legitimate purpose of protecting the public.2 47 He stated that
because of the severe limitations placed upon sex offenders, the uniform
application of these restrictions without regard to individual
dangerousness, and their lifetime application, Iowa's restrictions were
excessively punitive.248
The fate of these laws appears to be, at least partially, at the mercy of
empirical battles. Throughout its opinion, the Miller majority leaned
heavily on findings by the Supreme Court that sex offenders have a higher
risk of recidivism than other types of offenders.249 Recent studies paint a
different picture, suggesting that sex offenders do not reoffend as often as
previously thought.25 0 Because courts recognize the fifth factor as the most
significant, 251 future challenges under the Ex Post Facto Clause may hinge
on the results of future empirical studies and sources of evidence
considered by courts.

242. Id. at 724 (comparing the stigma attached to sex offenders to colonial punishments such
as "shaming, branding, and banishment").
243. Id. The effect of the residence restrictions was to force sex offenders to leave their
communities and live in rural areas or leave the state altogether. Id.
244. Id. at 725.
245. Id. Judge Melloy stated that it is impossible to distinguish between the legislative purpose
of reducing the opportunity to reoffend and the increase in negative consequences of an action
effectuated by the residence restrictions. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 726.
249. See supranote 205. For example, the majority cited this notion in concluding that Iowa's
residence restrictions were rationally related to the nonpunitive purpose of reducing the risk of
future sex offenses against minors. Miller, 405 F.3d at 721.
250. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
251. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 721 (stating that the fourth and fifth factors, relating to whether
a regulation is excessive in relation to a rational purpose, are the most significant factors in the
analysis).
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V. ANALYZING FLORIDA'S APPROACH TO RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS

A. Lessons from Miller: UpholdingFlorida s Statewide Restrictions
Under the Eighth Circuit'sAnalysis
In analyzing the validity of statutes enacted by the Florida Legislature,
the Florida Supreme Court has recognized that statutes are "clothed with
' The State of Florida has discretion
a presumption of constitutionality."252
under its "police powers" to enact policies for the health and safety of its
constituents. 3 As long as the exercise of the police powers is not arbitrary
and capricious,254 the State may enact legislation reasonably related to
safeguarding its children from harm when the potential harm outweighs
the interests of individuals targeted by the regulation. 255 Drafted with a
reasonable belief that buffer zones will reduce the temptation and
opportunities for sex offenders to commit new crimes against children,
Florida's statewide residence restrictions are a rational extension of this
authority. In considering the constitutional validity of these restrictions, it
may be helpful to analyze the Florida Legislature's approach under the
framework used by the Eighth Circuit in Miller.
On their face, Florida's statewide restrictions do not contravene
principles of procedural due process guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution. The Miller court rejected the notion that sex offenders had
a constitutionally guaranteed right to an individual hearing. 256 As in Miller,
the classifications drawn by the Florida Legislature, in drafting the
statewide restrictions, do not require a special procedure for individual
determinations of dangerousness.257 Both of Florida's statewide
restrictions impose blanket prohibitions against a group of offenders who
have previously committed crimes against children.258 Since proof of
future dangerousness is not material to the application of these provisions,
due process does not entitle sex offenders to any hearing to prove
otherwise.259

252. City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So. 2d 143, 146 (Fla. 2002).
253. Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 31 So. 2d 483, 486 (Fla. 1947).
254. McInerney v. Irvin, 46 So. 2d 458, 463 (Fla. 1950) (holding that a statute regulating the
use of communication wires by public utilities was not arbitrary or capricious, and therefore, was
a valid exercise of the state's police power).
255. Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. 1994) (holding that Florida's statutory rape
provision was constitutional, despite intrusion on privacy interests).
256. Miller, 405 F.3d at 709 (concluding that individualized hearings were not required
because the statute did not provide for exemptions to the classification based on dangerousness).
257. See FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2005).
258. See id.; id. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2).
259. See Conn. Dept of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003) (stating that "due process
does not entitle [the sex offender] to a hearing to establish a fact that is not material under the
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In addition, Florida's statewide restrictions likely provide sex offenders
with adequate notice. In Miller,the court rejected the claims that potential
problems with interpretation of restricted areas of residence and variations
in enforcement amounted to inadequate notice in the Iowa statute.26 ° Like
Iowa's statute, § 794.065 establishes the offenders to which the restrictions
apply,26 ' a finite number of facilities from which offenders are restricted,262
and the distance required for offenders to adequately separate from such
facilities.263
There is a legitimate argument that Florida's restrictions against sexual
predators have the potential to be overbroad in application. Section
947.1405 prohibits sexual predators from living within 1,000 feet of public
school bus stops and "other place[s] where children regularly
congregate. ' ' 264 These restricted areas are not clearly defined like the Iowa
statute in Miller, nor are they identifiable to the common observer.
However, since sexual predators are supervised and placed in housing by
the Department of Corrections (DOC),265 the DOC is responsible for
compliance with the statute. Thus, a sexual predator is not denied due
process by this provision.
The existence of separate ordinances in some municipalities could
complicate enforcement efforts for local law enforcement agencies
charged with carrying out the statewide restrictions. However, as the court
in Miller suggested, the potential for varied enforcement in Florida will
not be sufficient to invalidate the statute.266 Therefore, any successful
challenge under procedural due process would likely be limited to an asapplied challenge.
Under a substantive due process analysis, Florida's statewide residence
restrictions are clearly a rational extension of the State's authority under
the police powers. In following the reasoning of Miller, while § 794.065
and § 947.1405 may create obstacles in the day-to-day life of sex
statute").
260. Miller, 405 F.3d at 709.
261. Iowa's statute applies broadly to a person who has committed a criminal offense against
a minor, or an aggravated offense, sexually violent offense, or other relevant offense. IOWA CODE
§ 692A.2A(1) (2005). In comparison, Florida's statute of general application is more precise, noting
four specific crimes that make up the classification of offenders under the statute. See supra note
78 and accompanying text.
262. Compare IOWA CODE § 692.2A(2) (2005) (including public and non-public elementary
and secondary schools as well as child-care facilities), with FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2005) (including
schools, day-care centers, parks, and playgrounds).
263. CompareIOWA CODE § 692.2A(2) (2005) (dictating 2,000-foot buffer zones), with FLA.
STAT. § 794.065 (2005) (requiring 1,000-foot buffer zones).
264. FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (2005).
265. Id.
266. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 709 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that "due process does not
require that independently elected county attorneys enforce each criminal statute with equal vigor").
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offenders, the restrictions do not intrude upon any fundamental rights.26 7
Despite Florida's express recognition of fundamental rights in areas where
the U.S. Supreme Court has refrained from recognition, 26 none of these
rights are implicated by the buffer zones. As with Iowa's statute, Florida's
statute of general application, § 794.065, does not expressly dictate with
whom a sex offender may live 269 and therefore, effects upon family life are
indirect and incidental to the personal circumstances of a sex offender.
Similarly, § 794.065 imposes no obstacle on the free movement of citizens
of other states who wish to enter and exit the State of Florida. Finally, the
notion that Florida courts would recognize a fundamental right to live
where one chooses has absolutely no basis. Considering that Florida has
long been a leader in the area of state-powered land use regulation, 270 it is
highly unlikely that the right to choose one's future neighborhood would
be afforded any heightened interest.
Because no fundamental rights are implicated, Florida's statewide
restrictions are sustainable under rational basis review. 27 ' Though the
wisdom of placing residence restrictions against sex offenders may be
debatable, these laws clearly have some grounding in the legitimate
purpose of ensuring the safety of children.272 As noted in Miller, the
Supreme Court has recognized that "victims of sexual assault are most
often juveniles" and "when convicted sex offenders reenter society, they
are much more likely than any other type of offender to be re-arrested for
a new rape or sex assault., 273 Despite arguments that recidivism is much
lower than once perceived, experts still assert that limiting temptation is
an important factor in reducing the likelihood that sex offenders will

267. See id. at 709-13 (finding that incidental burdens placed upon family life and the ability
to travel between states do not amount to intrusions on fundamental rights).
268. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that public education is not a fundamental
right under the Constitution. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1,29-39 (1973).
However, in 1998, Florida amended the state constitution to make education a "fundamental value."
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (amended 1998).
269. Compare IOWA CODE § 692A.2A (2005), with FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2005).
270. See Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Florida'sPrivateProperty Rights ProtectionAct:
Does it InordinatelyBurden the Public Interest?, 48 FLA. L. REv. 695, 706 (1996) (describing
Florida's strong system of environmental and land use planning).
271. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 714-16 (upholding Iowa's residence restrictions under rational
basis review, in the absence of"a constitutional liberty interest that has been raised to the status of
fundamental right").
272. See Recent Legislation, CriminalLaw-Sex Offender Notification Statute-Alabama
Strengthens Restrictions on Sex Offenders, 119 HARV. L. REv. 939, 945 (2006). While not
convinced that sex offender laws are effective, the editors of the Harvard Law Review posited that
"[g]iven their popularity, their potential deterrent value, and the possibility that they may prevent
even a small number of crimes, tough sex offender laws appear to be rational.., public policy."
Id.
273. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32-33 (2002).
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reoffend.27 4 Therefore, Florida lawmakers, many of whom have children
of their own, may perceive a risk that sex offenders convicted of harming
children may harm children again if they have easy access to children.
Moreover, in its decision in Doe v. Moore, the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals demonstrated that it will not interfere with reasonable
regulations placed on sex offenders for the benefit of the state's citizens.275
In rejecting appellants' claim that the Sex Offender Act infringed on
fundamental rights to privacy 276 and interstate travel,2 77 the Eleventh
Circuit stated that the mere burdens imposed by registration and
notification requirements do not suggest that these regulations are
unreasonable in light of their rational connection to the legitimate purpose
of preventing future sex offenses. 278 There is, undoubtedly, at least some
logic in preventing sex offenders from having easy access to children.
Accordingly, the rulings in Moore and Miller suggest that opponents of
residence restrictions in Florida will have to look to a constitutional basis
other than substantive due process to challenge the rationality of these
laws, at least in federal court.
Self-incrimination challenges to Florida's statewide restrictions deserve
some consideration. Sex offenders in Florida are required to register their
address and location with local law enforcement under the Florida Sex
Offender Act.279 But under the Miller analysis, because Florida's statewide
residence restrictions do not expressly require a sex offender to provide
any information to law enforcement,28 ° the substantive rule prohibiting
residence within designated buffer zones of 1,000 feet stands
independently. 28' While law enforcement agencies in Florida have taken
a deliberate approach to enforcing these restrictions,282 the possibility that
registration could be used as the sole evidence of a violation would raise
concerns about Florida's statewide restrictions as applied to that
offender.283 While § 794.065, on its face, does not compel offenders to

274. Some sex offenders have admitted that restricting access to children will help reduce
impulsive temptations to commit an offense. Levenson & Cotter, supranote 13, at 173.
275. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
276. Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1345 (11 th Cir. 2005) ("We can certainly understand how
a person may be shunned by a person or group that discovers his past offense ... but, a state's
publication of truthful information that is already available to the public does not infringe the
fundamental constitutional rights of liberty and privacy.").
277. Id. at 1348-49.
278. Id.
279. Supra notes 43 & 46 and accompanying text.
280. FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2005).
281. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 716 (8th Cir. 2005).
282. See Ives, supra note 1, at AI (stating that Ocala police officers gave William Smith Jr.
several warnings before arresting him for violating the residence restrictions).
283. See Duster, supra note 123, at 768-69 (stating that registration of the address provides
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incriminate themselves, it seems unlikely that both the registration
requirement and residence restrictions can constitutionally coexist if local
law enforcement agencies immediately act to arrest sex offenders who fail
to register new addresses.
While the ex post facto challenge in Millerwas the most serious attack
on Iowa's residence restrictions, Florida's current statewide residence
restrictions are better suited to withstand attacks under the Ex Post Facto
Clause. 2" First, Florida's statewide restrictions impose less restrictive
buffer zones than those upheld in Miller.While Iowa's statute provides for
buffer zones of 2,000 feet,28 5 both § 794.065 and § 947.1405 limit the
restricted areas to 1,000 feet.2 86 Second, and more significantly, while
Iowa's statute applied retroactively, § 794.065 only applies to those
offenders convicted after the laws were enacted.287 Admittedly, §947.1405
applies retroactively to those sexual predators committing offenses
between October 1, 1995 and September 30, 2004.28 However, the
restriction is a term of conditional release. 289 Because a sexual predator
remains under the control of the State, residence restrictions do not
increase the term of confinement.2 90 Thus, the Florida Legislature has
likely protected the statewide restrictions against ex post facto attacks.29'

law enforcement with evidence of the only element of the offense and is enough to support a
conviction).
284. A finding that Florida's statewide restrictions survive a facial attack under the Ex Post
Facto Clause would automatically prevent any as-applied challenge. See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S.
250 (2001) (holding that a state statute found to be civil in nature, cannot be deemed punitive "'as
applied' to a single individual in violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses").
285. IOWA CODE § 692A.2A (2005).
286. FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a) (2005); id. § 794.065. Under the Eighth Circuit's reasoning
in Miller, there is no reason to think that this policy choice is excessive. See Miller, 405 F.3d at
723.
287. See FLA. STAT. § 794.065(2) (2005) ("This section applies to any person convicted of a
violation . . . for offenses that occur on or after October 1, 2004."). While § 947.1405 applies
retroactively to any sexual predator convicted of a crime committed after October 1, 1995, the
restriction is a term of conditional release. Id.§ 947.1405(7)(a).
288. Id. § 947.1405(7)(a).
289. Id.
290. See Mayes v. Moore, 827 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 2002), cert. deniedsubnom., Mayes v. Crosby,
539 U.S. 904 (2003) (holding that the conditional release program was not a recidivist program that
imposed an enhanced criminal penalty or sentence); see also Cal. Dep't ofCorrs. v. Morales, 514
U.S. 499,512-14 (1995) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to a California law postponing parole
hearings).
291. However, the Florida Legislature may want to revisit bus stop provisions within
§ 947.1405 and proposed amendments to § 794.065. Recent decisions in Eleventh Circuit district
courts suggest that prohibiting sex offenders from living within a certain distance from public
school bus stops may give rise to a legitimate ex post facto challenge. See Doe v. Baker, No. Civ.A.
1:05-CV-2265, 2006 WL 905368, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 5, 2006) (upholding Georgia's current sex
offender law, but finding that "[a] more restrictive act that would in effect make it impossible for
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Under the Eighth Circuit's analysis in Miller, Florida's statewide
restrictions should withstand judicial scrutiny. The State has wide latitude
in the use of its police powers to protect its citizens.292 While these
restrictions do present potential procedural due process and selfincrimination concerns on an as-applied level, they are not facially invalid
under the Milleranalysis. As drafted, the current restrictions are surely not
the end-all solution to preventing future sex crimes. Nevertheless, Florida
lawmakers should not be prohibited from zoning out sex offenders from
areas heavily trafficked by children.
B. UnintendedConsequences
Regardless of the constitutional validity of these restrictions, the
greater concern may lie in their effectiveness, or lack thereof. Both
commentators and local officials have pointed out a number of unintended
consequences associated with residence restrictions that may inhibit their
utility.293 These include problems with enforcement, the potential that
residence restrictions may prove counterproductive, negative impacts on
the families of sex offenders, and effects on the interrelations between
local governments.
1. Problems with Enforcement
A number of law enforcement and other local governmental agencies
have described the difficulties associated with enforcing residence
restrictions. First, many communities lack the resources to effectively
monitor the movement of sex offenders. 294 Enforcement has been made

a registered sex offender to live in the community would in all likelihood constitute banishment");
see also Whitaker v. Perdue, No. Civ.A. 4:06-CV-0140-CC (N.D. Ga. June 27, 2006), available
athttp://www.schr.org/aboutthecenter/pressreleases/HB 1059_litigation/LegalDocuments/
CooperORDER.6.27.06.pdf (issuing an injunction to prevent the enforcement of new legislation
in Georgia preventing general sex offenders from living within 1,000 feet of a public school bus
stop).
292. Supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
293. Duster, supra note 123, at 771-75 (stating that residence restrictions may have negative
consequences, including creating clusters of sex offenders, compromising rehabilitation efforts,
deflating real estate values, frustrating the job of parole officers, and encouraging sex offenders to
avoid registration requirements); IOWA COUNTY ATT'YS ASSOC., STATEMENT ON SEX OFFENDER
RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS IN IOWA 1-4 (2006), available at http://spd.iowa.gov/filemgmt
/visit.php?lid=284 [hereinafter IOWA CAA] (stating that residence restrictions in Iowa are difficult
to enforce, contribute to homelessness and a decrease in sex offender registration, frustrate efforts
to prosecute sex offenders, punish the innocent families of sex offenders, and put efforts to
rehabilitate sex offenders into jeopardy).
294. Sonji Jacobs & Jill Young Miller, Sex Offender's Tough Bill Gets Panel's Approval:
Sheriffs Leery of 1,
000-Foot Ban Around Bus Stops, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTTUTION, Mar. 22,
2006, at BI (stating that while sheriffs in Georgia support residence restrictions, they foresee
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even more difficult when sex offenders avoid registering their addresses
with local authorities.295 Considering that Florida has the nation's third
highest population of sex offenders living within its borders,296 monitoring
these offenders may prove daunting.297 Additionally, local ordinance
provisions prohibiting landlords from renting to sex offenders may be
extraordinarily difficult to enforce, considering that sex offenders are not
required to divulge information about the ownership of their residence in
fulfilling the statutory registration requirement.298
Residence restrictions may also impede prosecutorial efforts to obtain
confessions and negotiate plea bargains with sex offenders. Prosecutors in
Iowa have claimed that these effects may lead to a decrease in the number
of sex offenders who are held accountable for their crimes.299 Because
Florida's statewide buffer zones operate indefinitely,00 sex offenders in
Florida may be less inclined to cooperate with prosecutors. Then again, the
threat of longer sentences imposed under the Jessica Lunsford Act3 ' may
encourage offenders to come to the table.
2. Potential Increase in Rates of Recidivism
If Florida lawmakers are truly concerned with preventing sex crimes
against children, they should be mindful that current residence restrictions
might actually result in higher rates of recidivism among sex offenders.
Particularly, opponents argue that these restrictions compromise the
rehabilitation efforts of sex offenders.30 2 Schools, parks, playgrounds, and

themselves being overwhelmed "trying to keep track of who lives and works too close to a bus
stop"). Lucky for these Georgia sheriffs, a federal judge sitting in the norther district of Georgia
felt their pain. See supra note 291.
295. Davey, supra note 18, at Al (stating that the number of registered sex offenders in Iowa
now listed as "whereabouts unconfirmed" or living in "non-structure locations" has risen from 140
in the summer of 2005 to over 400 as of March 2006). In addition to searching out those offenders
who have avoided registration, the Iowa County's Attorney Association has found enforcing the
restrictions "nearly impossible" against those sex offenders who are no longer required to register
under Iowa law. IOWA CAA, supra note 293, at 3.
296. Carlson, supra note 98.
297. However, Florida's residence restrictions against general sex offenders only apply to
those who have been convicted as of October 1, 2004. FLA. STAT. § 794.065(2) (2005). Since that
excludes a large proportion of those convicted offenders living in Florida already, and many of the
offenders subject to the statute are likely currently imprisoned, enforcing these restrictions has not
presented the same challenges for law enforcement agencies in Florida.
298. See id. § 943.0435(2).
299. IOWA CAA, supra note 293, at 3.
300. See FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2005).
301. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
302. See Levenson & Cotter, supra note 13, at 174 (discussing the negative impact of
residence restrictions on efforts to rehabilitate sex offenders); Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 707-08
(8th Cir. 2005) (pointing to the concerns of psychologists for both the State of Iowa and the
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child-care facilities are typically located in those same areas where sex
offenders work, socialize and receive treatment. °3 Opponents claim that
sex offenders are least likely to reoffend when they have access to
treatment and stability in their lives."
By forcing sex offenders to move to the fringe of their communities,
Florida's statewide restrictions, coupled with tougher local restrictions in
some places, may cause these offenders to suffer emotional distress and
heightened temptation to reoffend.30 Should this be true, even those
people who argue that the interests of society always trump the interests
of sex offenders would likely question the wisdom of residence
restrictions. While sex offender treatment centers can certainly relocate to
better serve their clients, treatment alone does not prevent recidivism in
some offenders.3" 6 Thus, state and local officials should track the impact
of these restrictions closely to ensure that they are not making a difficult
problem worse.
3. Impact on Families
Sex offenders, despite their behavior, often have families. Opponents
argue that families of sex offenders are unnecessarily harmed by residence
restrictions when offenders have to pull children out of schools and force
their spouses to find new employment. 3" The resulting lack of suitable
housing available to sex offenders forces offenders to either uproot their
families from the community or separate themselves from their families
altogether.30 8 While Florida's current statewide restrictions are not as
exclusive as Iowa's, those cities with tougher local ordinances may leave
few suitable options for family housing.30 9 With the number of 2,500-foot

respondents that residence restrictions "might be counterproductive" to treatment of offenders).
303. Levenson & Cotter, supra note 13, at 172-73.
304. IOWA CAA, supra note 293, at 4 ("Efforts to rehabilitate offenders and to minimize the
rate of reoffending are much more successful when offenders are employed, have family and
community connections, and have a stable residence.").
305. See supra note 13.
306. ATSA Policy Statement, supra note 13 (stating that "treatment does not work well for
all offenders").
307. IOWA CAA, supra note 293, at 2.
308. See Davey, supra note 18, at Al (stating that many offenders in Iowa have left their
families to live with clusters of sex offenders in cheap motels). The clustering of sex offenders is
a fascinating issue in and of itself. See Jennifer Warren, Sex Offender Colony Proposed if
PropositionPasses, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, 2006 WLNR 16921672 (reporting on one sex
offender's view that California's ballot initiative-- Proposition 83-"threatens to create chaos and
wandering bands of rootless men" and that the state should create a colony for sex offenders and
their families in rural California to deal with displacement issues resulting from new residence
restrictions).
309. See Roberto Santiago & Sara Olkon, Up Front,Sex Crimes: Molestor Ban Poses Risks,
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local buffer zones being enacted in densely populated Broward County,
where there are 138 public elementary schools alone,310 sex offenders will
likely be forced to make a difficult choice.
4. Intergovernmental Competition
The race among local governments in Florida to enact exclusive
ordinances has created an urban landscape in which sex offenders are
pushed out altogether. For example, because the City of Miami Beach is
located on a densely populated, small barrier island, the effect of the
2,500-foot buffer zone is to prohibit sex offenders from living anywhere
within the city limits. 31' Regardless of whether these restrictions are
rational, municipalities are attempting to beat each other to the punch to
prevent any new sex offenders from establishing a residence.3 1 2 Local
officials feel pressure from the community to follow the lead of
neighboring municipalities for fear that their city will otherwise become
a haven for sex offenders.313
This intergovernmental competition presents both legal and political
consequences. The effective banishment of sex offenders from
communities provides ammunition for sex offenders, as well as
neighboring municipalities, to challenge the constitutional validity of these
local ordinances. 34 Local ordinances that apply retroactively will have
trouble fending off an ex post facto challenge. 1 5 Most notably, the
inclusion of temporary residences within local buffer zones may very well
intrude on the right to interstate travel, a situation contemplated by the

HERALD, Sept. 19,2005, at Al (relaying a statement by leaders of the Sex Offender Support
Network that roughly 80% of sex offenders who are released from prison return to their families,
and local laws that impose tougher restrictions are preventing these offenders from doing so).
310. Broward
County
Pub.
Schs.,
School
Related
Information,
http://www.browardschools.com/schools (last visited Mar. 26, 2006).
311. Susan Anasagasti, City Rejects County Sex-OffenderLaw, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 12,2006,
at Al.
312. Id. (quoting Miami Beach Mayor Alan Dermer) (stating that Miami Beach has reduced
its sex offender population from 33 to 23 since enacting the ordinance). "It's a very, very positive
step for this city and once again Miami Beach has led the way." Id.
313. Rebecca Dellagloria, Law Restricting Sex Offenders Passes, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 28,
2005, at ML. In passing 2,500-foot buffer zones in the City of Hialeah, a local councilman stated
that "[w]hat I didn't want was all these other cities passing something and Hialeah becoming a
dumping ground for all these [sex offenders]." Id.
314. Sherman & Waller, supranote 17, at 1B. Hollywood Mayor Mara Giulanti has stated that
the city might take legal action against surrounding cities that have enacted local ordinances
banning sex offenders, causing them to find refuge in Hollywood. Id.
315. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (stating that retroactive punishment will be
considered an invalid ex post facto law when it is so excessive in its effects as to negate a nonpunitive purpose).
MIAMI
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court in Miller.3 16 Looking at the political ramifications, these ordinances
create ill will among neighboring municipalities. Thus, local residence
restrictions could conceivably have negative impacts on dealing with such
shared regional issues as transportation and affordable housing." 7
C. State v. Local Laws: The Casefor Preemption
The Florida Legislature has conferred broad power upon local
governments to govern, provided that the ensuing regulations are not
inconsistent with general or special law.318 However, a local government's
use of that power may be found inconsistent with state law where the State
has occupied the field. 3 9 Even in those cases where the State has not
preempted local governments from acting, a local ordinance must not
specifically conflict with state law.320
The Florida Legislature has not expressly stated, within either
§ 947.1405 or § 794.065, that municipalities are prohibited from enacting
legislation differing from the statewide residence restrictions. 32' However,
an argument can be made that preemption is implied. Implied preemption
should be found to exist in cases where the legislative scheme is so
pervasive as to evidence an intent to preempt the area of regulation and
where strong public policy reasons exist for finding such an area to be
preempted by the legislature.322 By only prohibiting sex offenders from
living within 1,000-foot buffer zones, the State has allowed sex offenders
to live outside of that buffer zone. Local governments enacting larger
buffer zones are thus intruding on that right. Because Florida's statewide
buffer zones apply equally across the state, ostensibly without concern for
316. See supra note 181.
317. While the race to the bottom regarding laws against sex offenders may seem beneficial
to local politicians currently in power, adding hostility to the climate of regional dysfunction may
have dangerous effects on interlocal cooperation, particularly in South Florida, where the borders
between municipalities are virtually seamless and problems related to pollution, schools,
transportation, and affordable housing are shared by residents between three different counties. See
LYNN A. BAKER & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 725 (3d ed. 2004) (positing
that the "desire for local autonomy" may interfere "with regional decisionmaking even where it is
most obviously preferable").
318. Speerv. Olson, 367 So. 2d 207,211 (Fla. 1978). Section 125.01(1) of the Florida Statutes
grants counties the power to carry on county government. Id. at 211. "Unless the Legislature has
pre-empted a particular subject relating to county government by either general or special law, the
county governing body, by reason of this sentence, has full authority to act through the exercise of
home rule power." Id.
319. Id.
320. Thomas v. State, 614 So. 2d 468, 470 (Fla. 1993).
321. See FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (2005); id. § 794.065.
322. Tribune Co. v. Cannella, 458 So. 2d 1075, 1077 (Fla. 1984) (holding that the Public
Records Act, which provides for disclosure of information, preempts a local law relating to delay
in producing records for inspection).
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providing heightened restrictions in any particular geographic areas, the
statutory scheme is overtly pervasive.323
Additionally, there are a number of negative policy implications arising
from the existence of competing ordinances among neighboring local
governments. First, the race to push sex offenders out of communities
could leave few housing options for sex offenders, causing clustering of
offenders or even homelessness.3 24 Second, the displacement of sex
offenders from one community to another places undue burdens on local
governments that choose not to enact their own ordinance.325
Even if implied preemption is not found, local ordinances specifically
conflict with the statewide restrictions in several ways. First, a majority of
local ordinances provide for buffer zones of up to 2,500 feet,3 26 more than
doubling the distance of Florida's statewide restrictions.327 Second, most
local ordinances place residence restrictions on sex offenders for
temporary residences of four or more consecutive days.3 28 In contrast, a
sex offender could interpret § 796.045 to permit temporary living
arrangements with friends for weeks at a time, as long as the offender does
not establish a residence. Finally, local ordinances impose penalties in
conflict with those imposed by the State. In many cases, a sex offender in
violation of both the state and local ordinances would be subject to both
a criminal punishment imposed by the State and a civil fine imposed by
the local government.329

323. Allowing localities to expand buffer zones to 2,500 feet and beyond would frustrate the
purpose of the State's 1,000-foot buffers because locally enacted buffer zones would effectively
replace those determined to be appropriate by the Florida Legislature. See Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) (stating that municipalities are creatures of the state and
suggesting that in forming policy, the state is supreme and may legislate for its citizens as it will).
324. See supra notes 18 & 309.
325. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
326. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
327. See FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2005) (barring sex offenders from living within 1,000 feet of
designated areas).
328. Supra note 102 and accompanying text. According to the court in Miller, these local
prohibitions against temporary residences on their own could be fertile grounds for another court
to find a local ordinance unconstitutional. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
329. CompareFLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2005) (punishing a violation by an offender either as a
felony of the third-degree or a misdemeanor of the first-degree), with CITY OF LIGHTHOUSE POINT,
FLA., ORDINANCE § 54-11 (2005) (imposing a fine not to exceed $500 or imprisonment not to
exceed sixty days or both).
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VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM

A. Identifying an Opportunityfor FloridaLawmakers
Florida remains at the forefront of policymaking aimed at the
prevention of future sex crimes. In response to both advocacy for tougher
laws against sex offenders and criticism that current restrictions are
parochial, Florida legislators continue to consider reforms to statewide
residence restrictions against sex offenders. In fact, considering that six
greatly different proposals to modify residence restrictions against sex
offenders failed to make their way out of committee in 2006,330 a number
of bills are likely to come before the Florida Legislature when it meets
again in 2007. However, before amending current legislation or enacting
new legislation, legislators may benefit from the following model
legislation, aimed at clarifying statutory language, expressly preempting
local attempts to create separate residence restrictions, and narrowing
restrictions to a more dangerous group of offenders.
B. Model Legislation
794.065. Prohibited Places of Residence for Designated Sex Offenders
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) "day-care center" means any child-care facility, as defined under
§ 402.302(2), family day-care home, as defined under § 402.302(7), or
large family child-care home, as defined under § 402.302(8).
(b) "residence" means any residential or non-residential dwelling
where a restricted sex offender permanently resides, or any residential or
non-residential dwelling where a restricted sex offender routinely boards,
lodges or resides, including but not limited to any building or structure
owned or leased by the restricted sex offender, home of a friend or family
member, vacation home, hotel, motel or boarding house. 3

330. See H.B. 91, 108th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (died in Criminal Justice Appropriations
Committee on May 6,2006); S.B. 768, 108th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (withdrawn from further
consideration on April 28, 2006); H.B. 83,. 108th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (withdrawn prior to
introduction on March 7, 2006); H.B. 339, 108th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (died in Criminal
Justice Appropriations Committee); H.B. 591, 108th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (died in Messages
on May 5, 2006); S.B. 1054, 108th Reg., Sess. (Fla. 2006) (withdrawn prior to introduction on
December 19, 2005).
331. The model legislation contemplates a divergence in the state and local approaches of
regulating "residence" of sex offenders. Current state legislation prohibits sex offenders from
"resid[ing]" within 1,000 feet of designated facilities. FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2005). Whether
intentional or not, § 794.065 fails to elaborate on the meaning of "reside," leaving the term open
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(c) "restricted sex offender" means any person who has been
convicted of a violation of§ 794.011, § 800.04, § 827.071, or § 847.0145,
regardless of whether adjudication has been withheld, in which the victim
of the offense was less than 16 years of age.
(d) "school" means any public or private elementary or secondary
school, or religious institution that provides educational instruction on a
daily basis to minors.
(2) (a) It is unlawful for any restricted sex offender to establish a
residence within 1,000 feet of any school, day-care center, park, or
playground.
(b) The residential buffer requirement in (2)(a) of this section shall
be determined by measuring the distance from the outer boundary of the
residential property on which the restricted sex offender resides to the
outer boundary of the school, day-care center, park, or playground in
question, at their closest points. The distance shall be measured as the
shortest straight line between the two points without regard to any
intervening structures or objects.
(c) A restricted sex offender who violates this section and whose
conviction under § 794.011, § 800.04, § 827.071, or § 847.0145 was
classified as a felony of the first degree or higher, commits a felony of the
third degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082 or § 775.083. A
restricted sex offender who violates this section and whose conviction
under § 794.011, § 800.04, § 827.071, or § 847.0145 was classified as a
felony of the second or third degree, commits a misdemeanor of the first
degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082 or § 775.083.
(d) A restricted sex offender residing within 1,000 feet of any
school, day-care center, park, or playground does not violate this section
if any of the following apply:
1. The restricted sex offender established a residence prior to
the effective date of this section;
2. The restricted sex offender is a minor;
3. The restricted sex offender was a minor when the restricted

to interpretation. On the other hand, local ordinances more specifically address the meaning of
"residence," bifurcating the term into "permanent residence" and "temporary residence," and
explicitly defining the term "temporary residence" as "abid[ing], lodg[ing], or resid[ing]" in any
place for more than fourteen total days in any calendar year, or"abid[ing], lodg[ing], or resid[ing]"
in any place for more than four consecutive days in any given month. See supra note 102 and
accompanying text. Although the model legislation here has taken steps towards clarification, state
legislators may want to think about developing even more concrete terms. Determining a period
of time for establishing a residence appears somewhat arbitrary to this author, and perhaps is a task
more aptly performed by state legislators, who may as a group come to some sort of consensus.
Surely though, the more oppressive the time prohibition, the more likely it is for a court to overturn
new legislation. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility in Millerthat
restrictions on temporary living arrangements would offend the right to interstate travel).
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sex offender committed the offense and was not convicted as an adult;
4. The restricted sex offender subsequently married the victim
of the crime, and the restricted sex offender has not been convicted of any
other crime listed in (1)(a) of this section;
5. The restricted sex offender is residing in a full-time
rehabilitation center or is residing in a jail, prison, or other correctional
facility as required by the State of Florida; or
6. The school, day-care center, park, or playground located
within 1,000 feet of the restricted sex offender's residence, that would
ordinarily cause the restricted sex offender to violate the prohibition in this
section, was opened or began operation after the restricted sex offender
established his or her residence.332
(3) This section applies to any person convicted of a violation of
§ 794.011, § 800.04, § 827.07 1, or § 847.0145 for offenses that occur on
or after October 1, 2007.
(4) This section preempts any municipality or county from enacting
residence restrictions placing more restrictive prohibitions on sex
offenders than those restrictions provided in this section.
VII. CONCLUSION

In accordance with a public outcry, state and local governments have
enacted laws at a blistering pace to zone out sex offenders from areas
where children congregate. Under the broad authority of the police powers,
these residence restrictions represent legitimate steps to protect children
and their families from sexual violence.33 3 While all governmental efforts
are subject to the limits imposed by both the Florida and U.S.
Constitutions, courts give great deference to the policy-making decisions
of the legislature.334 So long as traditional notions of sex offenders as

332. Municipalities that have enacted residence restrictions oftheir own have provided, almost
unanimously, identical exceptions to residence restrictions for persons committing offenses as
minors, persons who established a residence prior to enactment of residence restrictions, and for
persons who established a residence and then would have been in violation because of the
relocation or creation of a target facility. See, e.g., CITY OF LIGHTHOUSE POINT,FLA. ORDINANCE
§ 54-11 (d) (2005). In considering the potential for conflict with rehabilitation programs and in an
attempt to bring these residence restrictions in line with a more rational approach to crime
prevention, the model legislation adds an exception for those sex offenders currently committed
to residing in rehabilitation centers or other correctional facilities. Cf.IOWA CODE § 692A.2A
(2005). Additionally, the model legislation adds an exception for those sex offenders whose status
relates solely to an unfortunate crime of statutory rape, where the offender and victim have
legitimized the relationship through marriage, as these offenders seem to be far from the intended
target of these buffer zones.
333. See supranotes 274-75 and accompanying text.
334. See Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 398 (Fla. 2006) (stating that "[a]s a general rule,
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incurable predators of children remain embedded in the minds of Florida
legislators and their constituents, courts will likely uphold Florida's
current statewide restrictions.
However, with an increasing number of municipalities in Florida
passing their own residence restrictions against sex offenders, it is only a
matter of time before a legal challenge makes its way through the courts.33 5
In foreseeing the potential for confusion and future litigation, state
lawmakers have called for new statewide restrictions that would impose
stricter regulations to match many of the new local ordinances and would
from enacting restrictions harsher than those
pre-empt local governments
33 6
statewide.
operating
Residence restrictions are a legitimate tool within the constitutional
mandate of legislative bodies to protect the safety and welfare of children.
Nonetheless, questions remain regarding their effectiveness. Will
residence restrictions discourage sex offenders like William Smith Jr. from
committing future crimes, or will these laws contribute to destabilizing the
lives of sex offenders, thus leading offenders to seek out potential victims?
Will some communities successfully rid themselves of sex offenders while
others find clusters of sex offenders moving into neighborhoods not
covered by residential buffer zones?
Before putting new statewide restrictions in place, Florida lawmakers
should recognize the numerous unintended consequences of current
residence restrictions and consider modifying these blanket provisions that
impose lifetime restrictions on thousands of people without regard to their
dangerousness.337 Specifically, legislators should consider amending
legislation to clarify statutory language, expressly preempt local attempts
to create separate residence restrictions, and narrow restrictions to a more
dangerous group of offenders. In order to protect the validity of statewide
courts may not reweigh the competing policy concerns underlying a legislative enactment.").
335. See Susan R. Miller, Doubts Emerge Over Sex Offender Buffers, PALM BEACH POST, June
16, 2005, at I B ("[A]lithough no legal challenges have been filed in Florida, a group of convicted
sex offenders in Binghamton, N.Y., sued the city Monday, June 13, 2005, claiming that a similar
law is unconstitutional and amounts to banishment."); Santiago & Olkon, supra note 309, at Al
("Harry Boreth, president of the Broward chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, said his
office is waiting to get the right plaintiff to challenge the ordinances.").
336. See Saunders, supra note 68, at IC (stating that Florida House members are interested
in uniformity because of the "hodge-podge" of restrictions that have contributed to one-upmanship
among localities; however, there are concerns over drafting legislation that is too strict and more
likely to be overturned by the courts); see also H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS OF H.B. 91, supra note 98,
at 1.
337. See Colleen Jenkins, Sex Offender Laws Unfairly Lumps All Together, Some Say, ST.
PETERSBURGTIMES, Nov. 22, 2005, at 3 (stating that critics ofFlorida's current statewide residence
restrictions against sex offenders are pushing for the adoption of a tiered approach that involves
"risk assessment that separates low-risk sex offenders from their more violent counterparts"). For
an example of this approach, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128 (West 2006).
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restrictions against general sex offenders, the Florida Legislature should
take note of recent decisions in federal courts regarding the limits of
acceptable residence restrictions.33 Legislators should avoid any attempts
to create buffer zones around public school bus stops or other moving
targets which are potentially overbroad in application and difficult to
enforce. If politicians are truly intent on protecting the state's youngest
citizens, they must craft meaningful and constitutionally-defensible
legislation that reflects more than the anxieties of the voting public.

338. See supra note 291.
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